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ABSTRACT 
This thesis divides the controversy over Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) into the phases of decision and deployment and assesses the influence of 
five independent drivers in this timeline: 1) changes in pressure from the United 
States 2) changes in pressure from China driving external structural changes in South 
Korea, 3) increases in North Korea’s nuclear threat, 4) the roles of the ROK’s powerful 
presidency and conservative South Korea’s policymakers, and 5) political participation 
of the public. The thesis evaluates how these drivers influenced Korea’s decision-
making from the start of the debate to the deployment of the THAAD system.
This thesis argues that, first, the North Korean threat played the most critical role in 
the decision itself and in accelerating deployment of THAAD throughout the timeline. 
Second, political pressures from the U.S. and China influenced Korea’s THAAD decision 
in different directions. Third, ROK policy-makers, a domestic factor, influenced the 
THAAD deployment decision but did not affect the deployment of THAAD equipment. 
However, the emergence of a progressive leader with different political tendencies 
contributed to the delay in the full deployment of THAAD. Fourth, participation of the 
public did not affect the THAAD deployment decision, but for a time delayed deployment 
after the THAAD decision. Finally, the external factors were hardly influenced by 
domestic factors, whereas instead domestic factors were influenced by external factors.
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
On July 7, 2016, South Korea and the United States announced the deployment of 
the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system on the Korean Peninsula.1 
They explained that this decision was aimed at preventing North Korea’s escalating 
nuclear and missile threats. Due to the North’s continued increase in nuclear threats and 
sophistication of its missile capabilities, the South Korean government needed measures 
to prepare for a possible attack. Among the proposed measures, the government chose 
THAAD as its military capability.  
South Korea’s deployment process, however, was not smooth. There has been a 
lot of fierce debate between those in favor and those in opposition. Finally, in April 2017, 
THAAD was deployed to Seongju, three years after the initial request by General Curtis 
Scaparrotti as the commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). 2  By contrast, Japan’s 
deployment process was different from Korea’s. In Japan, the THAAD radar was 
installed on two bases, deployed for the first time three months after the decision was 
made in September 2005.  
This thesis addresses the question raised by the longer time period for the decision 
by the Republic of Korea (ROK): “What factors influenced ROK decision making 
regarding THAAD deployment?” To understand the decision outcomes, this thesis 
evaluates external factors, such as changes in pressure from the United States and China 
and North Korea’s nuclear threat; and domestic factors, such as conservative South 
Korea’s policy-makers and the political participation of the public. This thesis examines 
this decision-making process in two phases: evaluates factors leading to South Korea’s 
                                                 
 1 Sang-Hun Choe, “South Korea and U.S. Agree to Deploy Missile Defense System.” The New York 
Times, July 7, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/world/asia/south-korea-and-us-agree-to-deploy-
missile-defense-system.html. 
 2 Sang Ho Song, “USFK Chief Recommends THAAD to Korea,” The Korea Herald, June 3, 2014, 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140603001294. 
2 
decision to deploy THAAD, and then assesses factors that account for the delays in that 
deployment.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis on THAAD is of great significance for three reasons. First of all, it is a 
meaningful study on the ROK-U.S. alliance. The ROK-U.S. alliance is undergoing many 
changes. The number of the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, up to 325,000 since the 
Korean War, has been greatly reduced, and many policy decisions have been made 
regarding Korea’s wartime operational control (OPCON).3 In addition, the ROK-U.S. 
alliance faces many upcoming policy decisions regarding the revision of the status of 
forces agreement (SOFA), the security burden, and the transfer of wartime OPCON. At 
this point, understanding the decision process surrounding THAAD deployment and 
resistance to THAAD will provide insight into variables that might affect future decisions. 
Second, the THAAD episode is an example of the democratic characteristics of 
South Korea and people’s involvement in decision making related to North Korea’s 
threats. South Korea has undergone many changes through the process of 
democratization. In particular, South Korea’s authoritarian democracy transitioned to its 
present liberal democratic phase through many social conflicts and struggles. In this 
context, analyzing how the THAAD decision regarding the issue of survival from the 
North Korean threat is related to the emergence of democracy in South Korea will 
provide important data to examine the relevance of the North Korean threat to South 
Korea’s democracy.  
Lastly, this thesis expands the scope of academic discussion about national 
security decision making. In particular, the analysis of independent variables and 
dependent variables related to Korea’s policy decisions entails applying existing 
theoretical discussions related to decision making to empirical evidence from THAAD in 
2016. There are few such studies related to the Korean government’s decision making on 
                                                 
 3 Hwee-rhak Park, “An Impact of the Controversies over the THAAD to the South Korea-U.S. 
Alliance and the South Korea-China Relationship : Application of Autonomy-Security Trade Model,” 
Journal of International Politics 21, no. 1 (June 30, 2016), 39. 
http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/ArticleDetail/NODE06696308. 
3 
THAAD. Many papers and materials tend to judge South Korea’s decision as a product 
of the great power competition between China and the United States rather than focusing 
on Korea’s decision making itself. Moreover, such studies tend to grasp the deployment 
of THAAD from the perspective of China and the United States rather than putting the 
weight of the discussion on the decision itself. Nevertheless, decision making in South 
Korea, as in any democracy, involves the interaction of complex factors. Therefore, 
research to reveal the variables that have affected the THAAD decision will be very 
meaningful to academic understanding of national security decision making as well as to 
practical knowledge of South Korea’s security posture and democratic institutions. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are three categories of literature related to South Korea’s THAAD decision 
making. First, some scholars have analyzed viewpoints that judgments based on 
inaccurate information have influenced policy decisions, focusing on policy-makers and 
individuals’ perspectives. Second, there are experts who assess how political controversy 
arising from the South Korean public’s concerns about the state’s survival and the 
transparency of the THAAD process has served as an independent variable in relation to 
the delay in the deployment of THAAD. Finally, there are researchers who argue that the 
deployment of THAAD was influenced by the U.S. and China’s hegemonic power race.  
One explanation for South Korea’s delay in deploying THAAD was indecision by 
policy-makers themselves. Brianni Lee asserts that the lack of long-term strategic 
viewpoints of policy-makers and the absence of economic and political judgment by 
South Korean policy-makers contributed to the deployment of the THAAD. 4 South 
Korea, the only divided nation in East Asia, has made military decisions that run counter 
to its long-term policy goal of seeking peaceful reunification with North Korea from a 
long-term perspective, as well as increasing military tensions in East Asia. These military 
tensions are definitely not economically and politically beneficial for South Korea. This 
                                                 
 4 Brianni Lee, “Thaad Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading to Political Regression.” 
Harvard International Review 38, no. 1 (January 1, 2017), 34–35. https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1906058571?accountid=12702 
4 
means that policy-makers lacked long-term strategic thinking and played an important 
role in the deployment of the THAAD.5 
Other researchers suggest that THAAD was deployed because some policy-
makers’ support for THAAD was challenged by various trends in South Korean public 
opinion. Hwee-Rhak Park focuses on individual perspectives in the decision-making 
process. Park tried to untangle the THAAD connection using the concept of 
‘misperception’ from Robert Jervis.6 According to Jervis, generally, decision-makers 
make decisions based on their rationality. This determination requires that information 
about the consequences of each option be provided to policy-makers and that information 
is accurate and reliable. Similar to an individual’s decision, there may be a 
misunderstanding in the state’s decisions, which Robert Jervis defines as 
“misperception.” 7 More precisely, as individuals make erroneous decisions based on 
uncertain knowledge and obscure information, national policy-makers make misleading 
decisions because of misperception. Misperception is also caused by various prejudices 
of individuals and groups, and Robert Jervis asserts that it actually happens quite 
frequently.8 It is difficult for any person to obtain all the information available about a 
particular issue, and because each person has a different perception framework to process 
such information, he or she makes various judgments for each person. This recognition is 
judged as “misperception” if the event or phenomenon is not properly managed due to 
significant differences from the real world.  
From this point of view, Park focused on individuals and policy-makers in the 
policy-making process to analyze their role in the decision-making process of THAAD. 
Park argues that the main reason behind the controversy of South Korea’s Ballistic 
                                                 
 5 Lee, 34. 
 6 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
7 Jervis. 
8 Jervis.  
5 
Missile Defense (BMD) is the misperception created by domestic public opinion, 9 
emphasizing that the “misperception” created by the people in the process of deploying 
the THAAD had worked on policy-makers.10 According to Park’s assertion, unconfirmed 
knowledge and information regarding how THAAD deployment would tie South Korea 
to wider programs of Missile Defense (MD) pursued by the United States created 
misperceptions among decision-makers that contributed to South Korea’s delayed 
building of the BMD capability. In sum, ultimately, misperception affected policy-
makers, which led to a delay in the deployment of THAAD. 
Park maintains that the development of democracy has been a major catalyst for 
these factors to work.11 With the development of democracy, the proportion of public 
opinion reflected in policy decisions is increasing. Yet, people are more likely than 
policy-makers to use insufficient or distorted information. As a result of the accumulation 
of misperceptions by the people in South Korea, they eventually pressured decision-
makers, which led them to fall into the dilemma of decision making. 
Furthermore, there are experts who argue that the public debate over the issue of 
people’s survival and transparency in procedures has affected the deployment of THAAD. 
South Korea operates as a democracy, which guarantees the participation of the people in 
policy by law, whether direct or indirect. With the development of many policy-
participation tools, political participation is carried out through various channels. For 
example, a group can stage demonstrations or suggest or oppose policies through the 
media. The development of democracy and the development of political means certainly 
serve as tools of pressure for policy-makers. 
As soon as the THAAD deployment was announced, many South Koreans 
opposed the deployment of THAAD for various reasons.12 The opposition’s argument 
                                                 
 9 Hwee-rhak Park, “Influence of the Misperception on the South Korean Ballistic Missile Defense: 
Focused on a Comparison with Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 24, 
no. 2 (July, 2017), 7–34. http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE07221337. 
 10 Park.  
11 Park, 17. 
12 Lee, 34–35. 
6 
was very intense on two factors. Opponents argued that the electromagnetic waves 
produced by THAAD would threaten the public safety and cause catastrophic damage to 
the environment. 13  According to the literature, these concerns might have affected 
THAAD deployment.14 At the time when the THAAD deployment was not completed, 
there was a presidential election in South Korea, and Moon Jae - In, a prominent 
candidate for the South Korean presidency, opposed Park Geun-Hye’s government’ s 
deployment of THAAD.15  
In addition to this fear of electromagnetic waves, scholars argued that the South 
Korean government’s secrecy surrounding the THAAD deployment was an important 
factor contributing to the emotional expansion of anti-THAAD sentiment.16 The Park 
Geun-Hye administration hastily passed the final deployment stage of the launch-pad to 
prevent the new president from overturning the decision, adding to the controversy of 
transparency. 17  In addition, the fact that the Defense Ministry did not intentionally 
announce that four new launchers have been introduced since the new presidential 
inauguration has complicated matters.18 In addition to these factors, the fact that the 
ROK government does not have the authority to acquire or intercept radar information 
related to North Korea’s missiles at the time of actual operation was also a factor against 
THAAD.19 For these reasons, opposition to THAAD has been actively mobilized around 
Seongju residents. These controversies further accelerated the momentum against the 
                                                 
13 Lee, 34. 
 14 Brianni Lee, 34–35; “THAAD on the Korean Peninsula,” Institute for Security & Development 
Policy, (October, 2017). http://isdp.eu/publication/korea-thaad/. 
15 “THAAD on the Korean Peninsula.”  
16 Lee.  
 17 Jenna Gibson, “For South Koreans, THAAD Isn’t about the United States, China, or Even North 
Korea…It’s about Park Geun-hye,” Pacific Forum, July 24, 2017, 
https://www.pacforum.org/analysis/pacnet-53-south-koreans-thaad-isn%E2%80%99t-about-united-states-
china-or-even-north-korea%E2%80%A6it%E2%80%99s. 
 18 Gibson. 
19 Gibson. 
7 
unilateral decision by the South Korean government as a representative democracy in 
East Asia and the government’s restriction of information acquisition by the people.  
Finally, some scholars articulate that the South Korea decision-making process 
has been affected not only by domestic politics but also by the power competition 
between China and the United States. East Asian countries, including South Korea, are 
realizing that they are in two orders: the U.S.-led security order and the Chinese 
economic order.20 This is because the U.S.-led East Asian hegemonic order is shifting to 
more complex directions due to China’s rise. For example, a meeting of think tanks in 
South Korea and the United States held in Santa Monica under the leadership of the 
Research and Development (RAND) Corporation in the United States in 2017 identified 
the primary threats to the ROK-U.S. alliance as instability and collapse in North Korea, 
China’s growing economic power, and conflicting signals from public opinion.21 Experts 
from the United States and South Korea are now worried about China’s growth, therefore 
China’ s economic impact would be a potential threat to the ROK-U.S. alliance. The 
hegemonic role that the United States has been guarding for a long time is being 
threatened by China.  
G. John Ikenberry argues that South Korea, which is heavily influenced by the 
United States and China, would have applied a strategy between “mixed strategies” and 
“bandwagoning” for decision making related to THAAD.22 South Korea is a middle 
power that is connected to both the United States and China. Ikenberry argues that as 
China becomes a regional power, the middle powers, including South Korea, will attract 
America and maintain the region’s balance of power. 23  It is possible to explain, 
according to Ikenberry’s argument, that the power imbalance caused by China’s 
                                                 
 20 G. John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State 
Strategies in East Asia.” Political Science Quarterly 131, no. 1 (March 2016), 9–43, 
https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12430. 
 21 Bruce W. Bennett and Booseung Chang, Strengthening U.S.-ROK Relations in the New 
Administrations of the United States and South Korea. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF364.html 
22 Ikenberry. 
 23 Ikenberry, 9–43. 
8 
continued economic development and military buildup has attracted the military 
resources of the United States in South Korea.  
According to Jaganath Sankaran and Bryan L. Fearey’s claims, China considers 
South Korea the weakest link among its allies and recognizes that it can weaken the 
ROK-U.S. alliance.24 South Korea and China promote each other’s national interests 
through productive economic partnerships and cultural exchanges, but they differ in 
recognizing North Korea’s problems. China shows a desire to avoid damage from 
political instability in North Korea, while at the same time aiming to minimize U.S. 
influence toward North Korea.25 South Korea, on the other hand, depends on the United 
States for its national security needs and relies on the United States to balance threats as 
North Korea’s threats increase.26 As a result, these researchers conclude that the change 
in perceptions of China and the influence of the United States caused a delay in the 
determination of THAAD to the South Korean government.  
Other research suggests that the power competition between the United States and 
China has influenced South Korea’s autonomy in its decision. James Morrow and 
Michael F. Altfeld insist on the inverse relationship between autonomy and security, 
where relatively weak countries like South Korea accept the sacrifice of autonomy in 
return for promoting security.27 In other words, a relatively weak country enhances its 
security by forming an alliance with a great power state, improving conditions to deal 
with the enemy that would be difficult with its own capabilities, such as the ROK-U.S. 
alliance since the Korean War.28 On the other hand, relatively weak countries are forced 
to sacrifice their autonomy to the great powers. 
                                                 
 24 Jaganath Sankaran and Bryan L. Fearey, “Missile Defense and Strategic Stability: Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea.” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 3 (September 2, 
2017): 321–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1280744. 
 25 Sankaran and Fearey.  
26 Sankaran and Fearey. 
 27 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model 
of Alliance,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 904–933. 
 28 Morrow. 
9 
Hwee-Rhak Park analyzed the influence of the United States and China by using 
the “autonomy-security trade off model” presented by Morrow and Altfield.29 According 
to Park’s argument, after the “strategic cooperation partnership” with China on August 25, 
2008, the economic dependence of China and South Korea has deepened, and this 
deepening relationship has affected the existing the ROK-U.S. alliance and affected the 
autonomy of South Korea in the course of the THAAD resolution.30 
As stated previously, much literature articulates the decision about THAAD 
deployment and associated factors that could affect the decision. Few studies, however, 
have been done in connection with changes in pressure from the United States and China 
regarding South Korea’s THAAD decision making. Many studies tend to dismiss the 
autonomy of South Korea’s decision making as being structurally affected. Yet, the 
structural explanation alone does not fully illuminate the role of South Korea’s decision-
making process. This is due to the fact that it is difficult to find data that can link changes 
in structure and decision-making. 
In addition, as other expert studies show, the shift in North Korean threats (from 
conventional to nuclear) plays a huge role in South Korea’s military policy making. 
North Korea’s steady provocations have always been emphasized as a political and social 
issue for South Korea since the Korean War. Because of these facts, the defense 
ministry’s highest priority always focused on North Korea’s military capability.  
The study of decision making by the Park Geun-Hye administration has not been 
done because of the large social issue of impeachment of the president. In other words, 
controversy in professionalism is a major constraint on decision making.31 But the Park 
administration is also a key link in the THAAD study because policy-makers play a vital 
role in policy decision making and policy changes in accordance with the conservative 
policy-makers. 
                                                 
 29 Park, “An Impact of the Controversies over the THAAD to the South Korea-U.S. Alliance and the 
South Korea-China Relation: Application of Autonomy-Security Trade Model,” 39.  
 30 Park.  
31 Sang-Hun Choe, “South Korea Removes President Park Geun-hye,” The New York Times, March 9, 
2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/park-geun-hye-impeached-south-korea.html. 
10 
From the realist point of view, it is possible to look at the problem through the 
lens of balance of threat and still find the THAAD deployment as insufficient. Even the 
deployment of this military resource was very controversial, which is hard for realists to 
explain. North Korea is apparently increasing its threat by developing and testing nuclear 
weapons and missile technologies, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) 
and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). External threats and changes in material 
power should be swiftly increased and defensive measures taken for South Korea, which 
regards North Korea as the biggest threat. Nevertheless, many people in South Korea 
opposed the deployment, and the deployment was delayed. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Factors affecting South Korea’s decision are diverse and complex. As described 
in the literature review, little prior research has utilized theories of national decision 
making to better understand national security policy outcomes in South Korea. This 
thesis will fill that gap by evaluating how four specific independent variables influenced 
South Korea’s decision-making on THAAD and the deployment, and what factors played 
a crucial role in that decision. 
Therefore, the dependent variable to be explained in this thesis is the THAAD 
decision-making process, including the initial decision for THAAD and the delay of its 
deployment. The independent variables are: 1) changes in pressure by the United States, 
2) changes in pressure from China driving external structural changes in South Korea, 3) 
an increased nuclear threat from North Korea, 4) the influence of conservative policy-
makers in South Korea, and 5) the political participation of the public. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To analyze the factors that influenced the THAAD decision-making process 
leading up to deployment in April 2017, this paper examines the factors that led to the 
THAAD decision-making process through the core techniques of the process-tracing 
research method in two phases. The first phase covers the period from 2014 when the 
initial THAAD controversy began to 2016 when THAAD deployment was decided. The 
second phase covers the period between 2016 and April 2017 when a few parts of the 
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THAAD system were first deployed. The reason why process tracing is used as a 
research method for this case is because it tracks causal mechanisms using a detailed 
analysis of how independent and dependent variables interact in real-life situations.32 In 
addition, this method of study is useful to increase understanding of causality that has 
resulted in specific historical cases.33  This thesis applies this method in two phases in 
order to identify whether different causal processes were important in each one.  
Overall, this thesis analyzes the external pressure change variables originating 
from the United States and China and the increase in North Korea’s nuclear threat as 
external factors in order to enhance understanding of the causal mechanism related to the 
THAAD episode from 2014 to 2017. At the same time, this thesis analyzes the 
conservative decision-makers in South Korea and the political participation of the public 
in terms of internal factors. Using process-tracing principles, the thesis will evaluate the 
relative importance of these key factors at various points in the two phases of the decision 
making on THAAD.  
Still, the limitation is that the independent variables of this paper are not 
completely independent. In more detail, the domestic variables, policy-maker and public, 
defined in this paper cannot be said to be completely free of external factors. Policy-
makers, for example, are very sensitive to U.S. and Chinese policy. Also, the public 
reaction to North Korea’s provocations is quite dynamic. Nevertheless, sometimes South 
Korea’s policy-makers make decisions that outperform the needs of China and the United 
States, and the South Korean public pays little attention to North Korea’s provocations. 
Considering these features, this paper will look at whether the relationships between 
variables were independent or dependent. 
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In addition to this analysis, this research examines how much external and 
internal factors influence the decision and delay of THAAD by tabulating a board (shown 
in Table 1) and seeks each factor’s interconnectivity and priority. 
Table 1. Example board for the THAAD decision and delay factors. 
 External Factors Domestic Factors 
1st Phase North Korea U.S. China Leader Public 
Nukes crisis      
Combined exercise  Accelerate Delay Accelerate  
…     Delay 
… Delay     
…      
…      
…      
THAAD Decision and delay 
Key: In the table, red: high, yellow: low,             : Dependence  
 
First, primary sources to look at changes in the security environment are defense 
white papers, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) annual reports, 
and official statements and documents by leadership. Secondary sources include news 
reports, research articles in the field of defense, journalist articles, etc. The main 
indicators used are changes in military equipment, changes in strategic weapons, and 
changes in nuclear threats. 
Second, primary sources for examining changes in the alliance with the United 
States are the Defense White Paper, interview materials of the decision-makers of the 
United States and Korea, security consultative meeting (SCM) joint statement materials, 
and official statements, and documents. Secondary sources include experts on the ROK-
U.S. alliance and articles. The indicators for analysis are the number of negative 
expressions of decision-makers in both the ROK-U.S. alliance, arms sales in both 
countries, and the number of combined exercises and operation. 
Third, to analyze Sino-Korean relations, primary sources are official statements 
and documents, and secondary sources use related articles and articles. This part uses the 
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number of mutual leadership visits, economic interdependence, and institution as 
indicators to investigate it. 
Fourth, in order to investigate the conservative decision-makers in South Korea, 
primary sources are official interviews, statements by leadership, and preferred policies, 
and secondary sources are reliable newspapers and experts’ reports and articles.  
Lastly, to find out the political participation of the public, this thesis looks at the 
V-Dem annual reports, reliable newspapers, expert papers and research, and government 
reports. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This paper consists of five chapters, starting with the Introduction, which includes 
the main research question, the major significance of research, literature review, and 
hypothesis related to the THAAD decision. 
Chapter II provides background for understanding the THAAD issue. First, it 
explains how North Korea’s nuclear threat changes until the THAAD debate begins and 
then explains the relationship between the United States and China. Finally, it describes 
the characteristics of democracy in South Korea related to domestic factors.  
Chapter Ⅲ focuses on the first phase, the period from 2014 when the initial 
THAAD controversy began until 2016 when the THAAD deployment was decided, and 
analyzes how four independent factors influenced the initial decision to deploy THAAD 
in the Korean Peninsula. First, this chapter examines changes in North Korea’s nuclear 
threat and ICBM capability, and conventional military capabilities to analyze changes in 
the security environment. In addition, this chapter analyzes how the ROK-U.S. alliance 
and the Sino-Korean relations structurally influenced South Korea’s THAAD decision. 
Lastly, it examines how domestic factors affected the THAAD decision itself.  
Chapter Ⅳ focuses on the second phase, comprising the period from the initial 
THAAD deployment decision until South Korea’s actual deployment of THAAD 
equipment to Seongju. Focusing on this period, this chapter analyzes the influence of four 
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factors, including domestic factors and external factors. Finally, conclusions are drawn to 
determine the crucial factors that affected the timeline of the THAAD deployment. 
The final chapter summarizes the main conclusion of the paper and outlines which 
factors influenced South Korea’s decision making and what factors created a delay of the 
THAAD deployment. This chapter then discusses the implications of these findings for 
both theories of national security decision making and for a better understanding of ROK 
security policy and democratic processes. Finally, this chapter discusses the limitations of 
the findings and opportunities for future research. 
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE THAAD 
This chapter describes the background of the Korean Peninsula security 
environment. The analysis covers international factors, as well as domestic ones. The 
reason for this analysis is that understanding the security environment of the Korean 
Peninsula is essential to understanding THAAD. 
A. NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAM 
North Korea’s nuclear program and missile development are considered a serious 
threat to the ROK-U.S. alliance.34 The threat judgment of the ROK-U.S. alliance has 
made the United States promise to provide extended deterrence by operating all military 
capabilities, including nuclear threats, conventional strikes, and missile defense, to South 
Korea. The two countries have concurred on this commitment at their Security 
Consultative Meetings every year since 2013.35 In other words, North Korea’s nuclear 
program and ballistic missile threats are a major factor in changing the threat perception 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance, which is a necessary factor in the determination of defensive 
assets related to THAAD.  
According to Glenn Snyder’s argument, external threats typically lead states to 
choose between options of “deterrence by denial” or “deterrence by punishment.”36 Also, 
for centuries, deterrence has been achieved by having the capability to resist enemy 
threats through the development of military power.37 In this context, to understand how 
South Korea reacted to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program in the first phase, this 
                                                 
34 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. Joint Communique of 50th U.S.-ROK Security 
Consultative Meeting (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2018). 
https://www.usfk.mil/Media/News/Article/1679753/joint-communique-of-50th-us-rok-security-
consultative-meeting/. 
35 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. 
36 Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 9–15. 
37 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea-United States Alliance (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 25. 
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section first reviews the process of change and development of the threat from North 
Korea up to 2013. 
North Korea has longed for nuclear development since the Kim Il-Sung regime, 
which recognized the power of nuclear weapons after the Second World War. From the 
regime of Kim Il-Sung, scientists for nuclear development were sent to the Soviet Union 
and educated. Since then, Kim’s regime has continued to develop nuclear weapons. In 
1982, however, North Korea’s nuclear program first appeared as a security threat to the 
international community when U.S. satellites detected the construction of a nuclear 
facility in Yongbyon.38 The United States pressured Russia to compel North Korea to 
join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, North Korea did not come 
into compliance with its NPT obligations and continued suspicious nuclear activities. 
After a crisis in 1993–94, the United States succeeded in temporarily shutting down the 
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon but failed to prevent North Korea from continuing its 
nuclear program’s ambition.39 
In the 1990s, North Korea showed its willingness to denuclearize several times to 
the international community, but at the same time, its behavior raised questions about its 
credibility. (See Table 2.) The credibility issue was further highlighted by the U.S. 
discovery of uranium-based program in the 2000s, with North Korea further 
strengthening its commitment to nuclear development through its withdrawal from the 
NPT. North Korea crossed a major threshold in its commitment to continued nuclear 
development by conducting a nuclear test in 2006.  
Subsequently, North Korea asked the international community for energy 
assistance and economic cooperation in exchange for giving up its nuclear program. 
However, as if to ridicule the international community’s efforts to denuclearize North 
Korea, it conducted two further nuclear tests in 2009 and 2013; in 2013, the destructive 
power was 6–9 kilotons, more than double the previous two nuclear tests. (See Table 2.)  
                                                 
38 Heo and Roehrig, 136–137.  
39 Heo and Roehrig, 136. 
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Table 2. North Korea’s nuclear threat timeline before 2014.40 
Timeline Description 
1985 North Korea signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
1992 North Korea signs the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula with South Korea. 
1993* The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requests that 
inspectors be given access to two nuclear waste storage sites. In 
response, North Korea threatens to quit the NPT but eventually 
opts to continue participating in the treaty. 
1994* North Korea and the United States sign an agreement. North 
Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear 
reactors at the Yongbyon site. In return, the United States, South 
Korea, and Japan form the Korea Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) to build two new light-water nuclear 
reactors. 
2002 The U.S. government reveals that North Korea has admitted 
operating its nuclear program based on highly-enriched uranium 
(HEU). 
2003 North Korea withdraws from the NPT and declares that they 
possess nuclear weapons. 
2005* North Korea tentatively agrees to give up its entire nuclear 
program, including weapons. In exchange, the United States, 
China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea say they will provide 
energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic 
cooperation. 
2006 North Korea conducts its first nuclear weapon test in October. 
2007* North Korea agrees to shut down its main nuclear reactor in 
exchange for an aid package worth $400 million, but North Korea 
misses the deadline.  
2009 North Korea conducts its second nuclear test on May 25. 
2013 North Korea conducts its third nuclear test on February 12. This is 
the first nuclear test under the Kim Jong Un regime. 
Note: * directly quoted from the CNN web source. 
 
While there was no public information proving that North Korea possesses 
operational nuclear weapons until 2013, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence in 
                                                 
40 Heo and Roehrig, 137–140; “North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts,” CNN, May 6, 2019. 
https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html. 
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January 2012 estimated that North Korea produced nuclear weapons.41 Even though it is 
difficult to find accurate data on the total amount of nuclear weapons possessed by North 
Korea, according to the SIPRI 2013 annual report, it is estimated that North Korea has 
about six to eight nuclear weapons.42 It is also estimated that North Korea possesses 
about 40 kilograms of plutonium, which can produce nuclear weapons through several 
reprocessing processes of spent fuel rods, and that North Korea is advancing the Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) program.43  
North Korea’s missile development began in earnest with North Korea’s nuclear 
development as it acquired missile technology from the Soviet Union from the 1960s. 
The North conducted its first test launch of the Scud-B at 300 kilometers (km) in April 
1984, and the threat of North Korea’s missiles has escalated in both quality and quantity 
over time, threatening the security of the ROK-U.S. alliance.44 The Scud-C missile with 
a 320-km range was tested and deployed in 1993. It was capable of hitting all parts of the 
Korean Peninsula. In addition, after the test launch of Rodong missiles with a range of 
1,300 km, it became operational. In 2007, Musudan missiles with a range of 3,000 km 
were deployed. As a result, North Korea has the capability to make a direct blow to South 
Korea, Japan, and Guam.45  
North Korea’s ambition for continued missile development has turned to long-
range missiles that could hit the U.S. mainland directly. Since the late 1990s, North 
Korea began developing ICBM capability under the Kim Jong-Il regime and tested and 
                                                 
41 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI yearbook 2013,” SIPRI, accessed August 
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launched the Taepodong-1 missile in 1998 and Taepodong-2 missile in 2006. It flew 
3,800 km to the east coast of Japan.46 
Under the Kim Jong-Un regime, which inherited Kim Jong Il’s power in 
December 2011, North Korea began testing missiles with ranges approaching the U.S. 
mainland. In April 2012, it failed to launch a long-range missile, Unha-3, using the third 
Taepodong-2 missile as the three-stage rocket.47 The fourth missile test took place on 
December 12, 2012, the same year as the third test, under a different name, the 
Kwongsong-4, and North Korea boasted extensively to the North Korean public and the 
international community that it successfully put a satellite into orbit, although the United 
States denied that the North Korean satellite had entered orbit normally.48 
Analysts argue that Kim Jong-Un is continuing to make efforts to show himself to 
be a worthy successor and that the success of the rocket test in 2012 not only served as an 
antidote to humiliating failures in the early days of his rule but also served as a decisive 
factor in Kim Jong-Un’s attempts to continue to strengthen his grip on strong military 
power.49  
In conclusion, despite international concerns and opposition until 2013, the 
North’s nuclear and missile program has continued to develop technologically due to the 
Kim family’s great interest and efforts, posing a threat to the international community as 
well as East Asia. Through numerous missile tests, North Korea has developed ICBMs 
that are likely to reach not only South Korea and Japan but also the United States. Three 
rounds of nuclear tests have resulted in the increase of its explosion scale from 0.5 to 2 
kilotons to 6–9 kilotons, but the controversy has persisted over whether North Korea has 
a warhead sufficiently small to fit on long-range ballistic missiles.  
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B. THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE AS AN ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCE 
The ROK-U.S. alliance has remained durable since the signing of the Mutual 
Defense Treaty in 1953.50 This asymmetrical alliance, forged shortly after the Korean 
War, still exists after the continued growth of South Korea’s economy and military 
forces. The United States is offering security and a nuclear umbrella to South Korea 
through the USFK stationed in South Korea. At the center of the USFK, the military 
forces of South Korea and the United States form the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces 
Command for command and control, and by developing and practicing operation plans 
(OPLAN), they are working to prepare for deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and war in 
case of emergency.  
The alliance between South Korea and the United States has been an asymmetric 
alliance between a great power and a weaker country since the Korean War. Immediately 
after the Korean War, Korea had to rely on the United States for its survival and handed 
over ROK military operational control to the United States. The asymmetry of the ROK-
U.S. alliance in the international system is evident when looking at their positions and 
influence in the international system, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Group of 
20 (G-20). In terms of economic power, as seen in Figure 1, the gap between South 
Korea and the United States has steadily increased since 2009.51 
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Figure 1. Economic power.52 
 
In terms of military power, the gap between South Korea and the United States is 
still considerable. Figure 2 shows the index from 2000 to 2018 by using the SIPRI 
Military Expenditure Database.53 According to this index, differences in military power 
between South Korea and the United States have diminished the gap in military power 
from 2014 to 2017 compared to before 2014, but there is still asymmetry. (See Figure 2.) 
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September 8, 2019, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/compare-countries/. 
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Figure 2. Military expenditure data.54 
 
The difference between the United States and South Korea in the international 
system is even more apparent. The United States, as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the UN.55 In voting on issues 
such as disputes that threaten international peace or enforcement including military 
forces, the United States, a permanent member, has one right to vote and additionally has 
the right to veto the final resolution.  
In contrast, South Korea served twice as a non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council in 1996 and 2014. Nevertheless, compared to the permanent members, 
the non-permanent members have a short term of two years and have no veto power. This 
confirms that the difference between South Korea and the United States is relatively 
large. 
In sum, the alliance between South Korea and the United States is a clearly 
asymmetric relationship because of the difference between their economies, their military 
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powers, and their influence in the international system. Analyzing material power 
differences within an alliance is very meaningful. From the realist point of view, this 
difference in power is highly likely to stress the autonomy of a relatively weak state in 
bilateral alliance relations.  
C. SINO-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS 
Since implementing its reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China has emerged 
as an economic power by continuing its rapid economic growth in the subsequent 
decades. In particular, the concept of “peace and development” has been consistently 
emphasized by China, which emphasizes “development” under the larger framework of 
world peace.56 After reshuffling the leadership system at the Communist Party’s 13th 
Plenary Session in the fall of 1989, China actively promoted diplomatic relations with the 
West to break away from international isolation, restored its external image, and created 
an environment where it could focus on economic development.57 China has also opened 
up a new era of diplomacy by expanding its multilateral and broad diplomacy with 
neighboring Asian countries including South Korea. 
Seoul and Beijing signed formal diplomatic relations on August 24, 1992, about 
half a century after their ties were severed following the Korean War.58 The diplomatic 
relations between South Korea and China are a significant turning point, as they have 
overcome different systems and ideologies and established formal diplomatic ties.  
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, South Korea and China have 
formed a strategic cooperative system as leaders of the two governments, parliaments, 
political parties, and the media have visited each other in major policy areas, including 
the summit talks.59 
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Since 1992 under Deng Xiaoping, China has emphasized economic construction 
as the country’s first goal, and the Chinese leadership has adopted ‘Creating a peaceful 
environment for domestic economic construction’ as its foreign policy. The contents of 
this foreign policy include “developing friendly relations with neighboring countries,” 
“strengthening cooperation with third countries,” “strengthening relations with the West 
and developing economic relations,” “strengthening UN diplomacy” and finally 
“peaceful resolution of international issues.” Among these, “developing friendly relations 
with neighboring countries” became the main emphasis. The reason was that relations 
with neighboring countries directly affect China’s economic, political, and security 
interests.60  
Since 1992, relations between South Korea and China have made remarkable 
progress in many fields, including politics, economy, society, and culture. In May 2008, 
South Korea and China held a summit meeting with President Hu Jintao during President 
Lee’s visit to China and raised officially bilateral relations from “full-scale cooperative 
partnership” to “Strategic Partnership.”61 Based on this fact, South Korea and China 
have given new meaning to building mutual relations and raised the relationship between 
the two countries to the strategic level, including cooperation in politics, economy, 
society, culture, and on the regional and international stage.  
The Sino-South Korean relationship was a leap forward in the era of the Park 
Geun-Hye administration. A formal visit to South Korea by President Xi Jinping took 
place in July 2014. In 2015, President Park’s visit to China during the China Victory Day 
parade, which was the first visit by a South Korean president,  served as a very significant 
turning point in building bilateral relations.62 
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On June 2, 2015, South Korea’s President Park Geun-Hye and Chinese President 
Xi Jinping agreed officially on the South Korea-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA).63 
The discussion on the South Korea-China FTA started with an unofficial feasibility study 
on the China-ROK Free Trade Area of China’s President Hu Jintao and South Korea’s 
President Roh Moo-Hyun in November 2004. After 11 years, it took effect on December 
11, 2015, with the approval of the Parliament. Under the agreement, South Korea 
eliminates tariffs on 92% of Chinese products within 20 years, and China abolishes tariffs 
on 91% of South Korean products.64  
South Korean President Park said that the Korea-China FTA is a historical 
milestone for deepening the “Strategic Cooperative Partnership” between the two 
countries and serves as an institutional framework for future cooperation, and Chinese 
President Xi Jinping commented that the FTA would leap forward in bilateral trade 
relations, which would give substantial benefits to the people of both countries and would 
contribute to economic integration in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region and the 
development of the world economy.65 
In terms of trade size, the Korea-China FTA was the largest FTA among China’s 
FTAs, and the Korea-China FTA cover 17 sectors, including electronic commerce and 
government procurement as well as goods and services and investment and trade rules. 
Many Chinese experts welcomed the decision, saying that the FTA with South Korea is 
the highest-level free trade agreement among China’s FTAs with other countries and that 
it would serve as a new growth engine for China and Korea.66 
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In sum, the relationship between Korea and China has become very close 
politically and economically. Politically, they established a cooperative relationship 
through an institutional framework, and economically, Korea became increasingly 
dependent on China. This economic dependence, like Park’s claim, is likely to weigh 
heavily on Korea’s autonomy if China’s national interests are violated.67   
D. SOUTH KOREAN POLICY MAKING 
1. Democracy and the Presidential System in South Korea 
Since democratization in 1987, democracy in Korea has grown very rapidly both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. The president was elected by a procedural presidential 
election, and the progressive regime peacefully replaced the conservative regime for the 
first time by the election of Kim Dae-Jung. The progressive regime, which had been in 
place for ten years, was likewise replaced by a conservative regime through a peaceful 
and procedural democracy. All of this went smoothly without the crisis of returning to 
authoritarianism, and there was no democratic decline during the two economic crises. 
Unlike other politically regressive countries, such as those in Central Asia and South 
America, despite achieving a procedural democracy, South Korea has established itself as 
a representative country of economic development and democracy.  
The South Korean government has accepted forms of a presidential system since 
its founding. In the chaos of the revolution in April 1960, a nine-month parliamentary 
system was implemented, but the government soon returned to the authoritative 
presidential system. Bruce Harrison defines this Korean presidency as the “Imperial 
Presidency.”68 According to Harrison, as with other Asian countries, the president of 
South Korea has much power.69 For example, the president has the power to neutralize 
the legislative powers of parliament because he can take the initiative to submit 
legislation guaranteed by the Constitution. The president can also involve lawmakers, 
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especially ruling parties, in the cabinet. The South Korean President has dominant power 
within that country’s democratic system. Due to these characteristics, many people in 
South Korea are discussing the improvement of the presidential system. The presidential 
system of South Korea has the following characteristics.  
First, the presidential system of South Korea is less likely to compromise. One 
shortcoming of the presidential system is that only one candidate and one party can win 
the presidential election. In this winner-take-all system, politics easily becomes a zero-
sum game, making tolerance and compromise difficult. Because of this feature, political 
parties use all social and political issues as tools for fighting to take power and focus on 
fighting itself.70 
Second, corruption is a bigger issue in South Korea, of course, partly as a feature 
of presidential systems in general (due to power concentration) but also in South Korea in 
particular. Ho-ki Kim claimed that an incompetent and irresponsible president could be 
elected within the South Korea presidential system.71 In the presidency, the president is 
the sole executive with ultimate decision-making power, and professionalism and 
morality are essential. The presidency emphasizes the checks and balances between 
parliament and the government but places the ultimate authority of policy enforcement on 
a single president. Because of the high dependence on a single president, the direction of 
politics depends on the president’s qualities and abilities, and the risk of sudden death or 
corruption of the president is great. For these reasons, corruption is a bigger problem in 
South Korea.  
Third, the continuity of policy is limited in South Korea’s presidential system.72 
This is because, according to the Constitution, successive re-elections are impossible in 
the presidential system of Korea. These institutional features cause South Korean 
presidents to push their agenda too quickly, creating much friction and conflict in society. 
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The newly changed president is also able to overturn the previous president’s policies. 
The emergence of a progressive regime due to the impeachment of President Park Geun-
hye was very likely to influence the THAAD decision made by the Park Geun-hye 
administration.  
2. Legacy of the President Park 
In 2013, Park Geun-hye began her term as president. She is the daughter of Park 
Chung-Hee, famous for being a dictator in South Korea. President Park Chung-Hee’s 
authoritarianism was quite a famous case not only in Asia but also outside of Asia. His 
authoritarianism contributed much progress in the economy by showing the 
characteristics of the developmental state. He also established the Economy Planning 
Board (EPB), which led to economic development. 73  President Park’s development 
model was to carry out planned economic development based on the power of a strong 
government. President Park Chung-Hee’s development model achieved exceptional 
results, and equivalent economic growth rates are hard to find in the world history. This 
economic development continued to give him political legitimacy.74  
Nonetheless, the Park Chung-Hee administration faced a political crisis as it 
entered 1972, worsening its trade balance and preventing local companies from exporting 
due to U.S. import restrictions.75 To get out of the political predicament, Park Chung-
Hee initiated a coup, consequently amending the constitution to make it possible for long-
term power. This dictatorship lasted until he was assassinated. 
Similar to her father’s policy, President Park Geun-Hye argued that economic 
development was the top priority of the country, with an emphasis on promoting 
economic development plans. 76 Many people said that the expectation for economic 
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development was the reason they chose her as president.77 These findings reflect the 
public sentiment that the public expected her to perform like her father and produce 
similar outcomes. 
However, the issue of political legitimacy continued to bother the new Park 
administration. Along with the launch of the Park Geun-Hye regime, controversy over 
election intervention by the National Intelligence Service occurred, which affected the 
legitimacy of the new president. In addition, the forced dissolution of political parties and 
the arrest of lawmakers led many experts to argue that South Korea’s political system 
was returning to an authoritarian system.78 Also, her governing style, represented by her 
lack of communication and conversation, was another strong comparison with her 
father.79  
President Park Geun-hye’s corruption using her personal acquaintance with Choi 
Soon-sil, which began in April 2016, disrupted the entire Korean society.80 President 
Park eventually was impeached peacefully in December because of this scandal and 
resigned from office. Among the reasons for impeachment related to the scandal: 1) 
President Park made Choi Soon-sil engage in national policy and civil servants’ 
personnel policy, and pursued Choi’s private interests. 2) President Park forced Chaebol 
to give a bribe to Choi Soon-sil. President Park’s corruption also influenced THAAD 
decisions, because people began to believe that her claims and opinions about THAAD 
were related to corruption. 
E. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PUBLIC  
It was during the Kim Dae-Jung regime that public participation emerged as a 
new alternative to democracy rather than as representative of democracy in Korean 
society. The Kim Dae-Jung administration, which took power during the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis, made a great compromise on the revision of labor law 
through the Korea Tripartite Committee, a form of social consensus.81 This led to a new 
system in which representatives of interest groups representing the workers’ and social 
sectors and government representatives gather in one place to reconcile interests with 
dialogue and compromise and to create policy alternatives. The emergence of this system 
was regarded as an extension of participatory democracy in that workers ‘groups, which 
had been excluded from the policy-making process, participated in the policy-making 
process with the same qualifications as employers’ groups. This social consensus system 
remains as a decision-making body to solve class conflict.  
The Roh Moo-Hyun government, which had a similar political tendency with the 
Kim Dae-Jung government, wanted to extend the scope of this system to civil society.82 
This period coincided with the collapse of the dominant role of newspapers and 
broadcasting in public opinion formation due to the popularization of the Internet. South 
Korea’s 16th presidential election was so decisive that it showed the Internet had a 
crucial impact on the election results. The Internet has played an important role in 
attracting young voters to the political arena, which is overwhelmed by indifference and 
political aversion.83   
Entering the Lee Myung-Bak administration, the dominant claim was that Korea’s 
democracy has been stably consolidated at an institutional level.84 This is because the 
political power has been continuously changed through elections. Unlike the progressive 
president, however, he continued to attempt to institutionally curb political participation 
of the public, questioning the assertion that democracy had been consolidated.85 For 
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example, after the candlelight rally in 2008, the Lee Myung-Bak administration revised 
the law on public assembly and demonstrations, contributing to undermining the political 
rights of assembly.86 Besides, the Lee Myung-Bak administration also attempted to enact 
a “group litigation law” to introduce a class action system that facilitates compensation 
for citizens who drive and sympathize with rallies or demonstrations.87   
As the Park Geun-hye regime entered, the political participation of the people was 
carried out within a more active and institutional framework. This political crisis played 
out in a democratic and constitutional framework.88 The people were angry at the Choi 
Soon-sil scandal, and through candlelight rallies expressed their anger over the 
president’s incompetence. This is the only South Korean impeachment case created 
within its institutional framework, following its procedures and peacefully removing the 
President from government. This indicates that Korean democracy has matured 
institutionally compared to previous cases. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has summarized the background of the Korean Peninsula security 
environment from the perspective of the five main drivers the thesis is examining:  North 
Korean nuclear and missile development, the U.S.-ROK military alliance, evolving 
relations between South Korea and China, the importance of presidential power in the 
current ROK government system, and the growing role of public opinion in South 
Korea’s consolidating democracy. The following two chapters examine more closely the 
roles of these factors in decision making on THAAD, first in the phase leading up to the 
ROK decision to deploy THAAD, and then in the phase between that decision and actual 
deployment. 
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III. SOUTH KOREA AND THE THAAD: FROM INITIATION TO 
DECISION 
This chapter examines five independent variables and how they led South Korea 
to decide to implement the THAAD system: 1) changes in pressure from the United 
States, 2) changes in pressure from China that were driving external structural changes in 
South Korea, 3) an increased nuclear threat by North Korea, 4) the influence of 
conservative South Korean policy-makers, and 5) the political participation of the public. 
The chapter depicts how these factors interacted with each other during the first phase of 
the THAAD story. It first traces South Korea’s changing reaction and the interaction of 
the independent variables during critical events. It then analyzes possible causal 
relationships and the overall importance of each variable. For each key point in the 
sequence of events, the chapter provides a table summarizing which factor(s) drove 
outcomes, whether these factors served to accelerate or delay THAAD deployment, and 
what other factors were dependent on them.  
The investigation finds that North Korea’s increasing nuclear threat has 
contributed most to the THAAD decision of South Korea, followed by South Korea’s 
policy-makers and changes in pressure from the United States and China. Among the 
domestic factors, the public participation factor does not affect the decision. 
A. FROM INITIATION OF THE THAAD TO THE DECISION 
1. The Rodong Missile Launch by North Korea 
North Korea’s Rodong missile test changed South Korea’s response to THAAD 
for the first time. This was because of worries about South Korea’s missile defense 
capability. 
The THAAD issue began with remarks by U.S. Army Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, 
commander of the USFK. He first expressed the need to deploy the THAAD system on 
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the Korean Peninsula at the hearing of the National Assembly in 2013.89 The commander 
of the USFK is the highest authority of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and his claim was 
profoundly meaningful to the South Korean government and ROK forces. 
Soon thereafter, on January 1, 2014, in the North Korean New Year’s remarks, 
Kim Jong-Un insisted that “strong self-defense power will protect the country’s 
sovereignty and peace,” cementing his determination to increase the proportion of raw 
and other materials needed for economic development to cope with international pressure 
that was creating obstacles to developing nuclear weapons. In other words, he expressed 
to the international community the fact that he intended to further strengthen North 
Korea’s nuclear weapon development will while maintaining North Korea’s traditional 
economic framework and to concentrate on the continuous development of nuclear 
weapons.90  
Unlike Kim Jong Un’s wish, South Korean President Park emphasized the 
“economy” in her New Year’s remarks and stated that peaceful unification is necessary 
for sustainable economic development. Her economic-centered arguments continued at a 
press conference on January 6, 2014, five days after her New Year’s remarks, when 
President Park said that North Korea’s nuclear threat, the biggest obstacle to unification 
and economic development in South Korea, could never be neglected. She argued that 
she would seek various ways to prevent North Korea’s nuclear development and to 
completely abolish it.91 Her statement spoke for South Korea’s position, which meant 
that THAAD was one of the means to counter North Korean threats, but South Korea did 
not yet consider THAAD itself.  
                                                 
89 Heejun Kim, “sa-tuTHAAD han-pan-to pay-chi non-lan-ss kwuk-ik-i wu-sen-i-ta,” [Controversy 
over the Deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula... National Interest Comes First] Korea 
Broadcasting Journalist Association 24 (May 2015): 38–39. 
90 Sang-don Jeong, “2014nyeon bug-han sin-nyeon-sa-ui ham-ui-wa u-li-ui dae-eung-bang-hyang,” 
[The Implications of North Korea’s New Year’s Address in 2014 and the South’s Countermeasures] Korea 
Defense Issue & Analysis, no. 1498 (14-3), (January 20, 2014): 3–4. 
http://www.kida.re.kr/frt/board/frtNormalBoardDetail.do?sidx=382&idx=1548&depth=4 
91 “President Park 2014 New Year Initiative,” Yonhap News, January 6, 2014, accessed September 11, 
2019, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20140106074300001. 
35 
On February 13, 2014, a representative for the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD) John Kirby said in a briefing that South Korea and the United States were 
discussing the THAAD deployment to the Korean Peninsula. Yet, shortly after the 
briefing, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense denied the agreement on the 
THAAD issue, saying that the official position of the United States did not constitute any 
decisions.92 Such disclosure and “walking back” continued to increase confusion. 
Meanwhile, North Korea reacted very sensitively to the South Korea-U.S. 
alliance’s drills on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea carried out a provocation, 
denouncing the annual U.S. and South Korean joint military exercise, which began on 
February 27, 2014, at the Kittaeryong missile base (see Figure 3). In addition, North 
Korea fired four SRBMs days after Key Resolve/Foal Eagle (KR/FE) began, heightening 
military tensions and expressing its disapproval of a nuclear-capable U.S. B-52 bomber 
flight that flew from South Korea in the same month.93 North Korea had consistently 
condemned the OPLAN practice of the ROK-U.S. alliance, but contrary to North Korea’s 
expectations, South Korea had not significantly responded to the SRBM tests. South 
Korea even provided governmental humanitarian assistance to help North Korea address 
an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, and it expected to meet with North Korea after 
training with the United States.94 
Despite the humanitarian help from South Korea, North Korea continued its 
missile tests: the SRBM launch on March 3, 2014, and the Rodong missiles launch on 
March 26, 2014. It was noteworthy that the missiles were launched at new locations, 
Wonsan Kalma International Airport and Sunchon Airbase, and the Rodong missile was 
launched for the first time since 2009.95  The previous test launch was conducted at 
testing sites and focused on the development of missiles, but this test showed that 
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missiles could be launched from mobile facilities such as transporter-erector-launchers 
(TEL) in military operation areas such as airfields. Besides, North Korea changed the 
way to fire by increasing the firing angle rather than the distance.  
The ROK-U.S. alliance had been concerned since North Korea tested the launch 
of Rodong missiles with a range of 1,300 km in a lofted trajectory manner. South Korea 
worried about whether its own missile defense could intercept a high-speed missile at the 
terminal phase given North Korea’s new missile tactic.96 Also, South Koreans reacted 
more sensitively to North Korea’s missile launches that day as March 26, 2014, was the 
fourth anniversary of the sinking of a South Korean warship. Meanwhile, Seoul’s 
Ministry of National Defense (MND) stepped up its criticism of the North’s actions, 
referring to them as a “grave provocation.”97  
Table 3. The Rodong missile launch by North Korea. 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat Low Accelerate  
United States   North Korea 
China    
Policy-Maker    
Participation of the public   North Korea 
 
2. South Korea’s Strategic Ambiguity 
China’s THAAD anti-deployment efforts helped South Korea maintain strategic 
ambiguity in its THAAD policy and contributed to delaying the THAAD decision. 
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On June 3, 2014, Gen. Scaparrotti, USFK commander, repeatedly mentioned the 
THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula during a lecture at the Korea Institute for 
Defense Analyses. In response, South Korea’s defense minister told the National 
Assembly that he was not opposed to the THAAD deployment.98 This was because the 
U.S. military’s THAAD system, along with its existing Patriot missiles, would improve 
South Korea’s capability to intercept North Korean ballistic missiles.99 He maintained a 
vague position, however, arguing that THAAD was the property of the U.S. military and 
there was no justification for opposing the deployment of U.S. property to a U.S. military 
base in South Korea. This remark meant that he was in favor of deploying THAAD at the 
U.S. bases at the will of the United States, because he also considered this was not 
subject to the will of South Korea.  
Meanwhile, North Korea continued to focus on the launch of the highly reliable 
SRBM and continuously changed the launch site. The SRBM was launched from Hodo 
on June 26, 2014, and three days later from Masikryong, located west of Wonsan Airport. 
The point of note was that the launch site had been constantly changed. (See Figure 4.) 
This change in North Korea was an important factor that reflected much strategic 
importance under the Kim Jong-Un regime, which caused much concern for the ROK-
U.S. alliance. As the launch site was continually changed, the ROK-U.S. alliance would 
need to devote a great deal of attention and monitoring in advance to detect and identify 
missile launches, as for some launch experiments the alliance had failed to identify the 
exact location immediately after launch.100 Nevertheless, South Korea’s official response 
focused on surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and the response to THAAD remained 
unchanged. 
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Figure 3. North Korea’s missile test sites in 2014.101 
On July 3, 2014, China conveyed the idea that THAAD deployment hurts China’s 
national interests, and so even leaders of that country expressed their opposition to the 
deployment. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, visited South Korea 
and conveyed his opposition to THAAD in person to President Park directly. At the 
South Korea-China summit held in Seoul, Chinese President Xi Jinping insisted that 
South Korea should express its opposition stance to the United States as a sovereign state 
so that the THAAD would not become a problem between South Korea and China, and 
asked South Korea’s President Park Geun-Hye not to deploy the THAAD.102 Despite 
China’s efforts, South Korea’s opposition to THAAD in the Sino-Korea joint statement 
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was hard to find. 103  On the other hand, China was able to obtain South Korea’s 
commitment to official denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean 
government’s response disappointed the hard-liners, who advocated for the return of U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula again. In addition, on July 20, 2014, 15 
days after the summit between South Korea and China, South Korea’s newly appointed 
defense minister represented Seoul’s position as if to consider China’s concerns, similar 
to what his previous defense chief said at the National Assembly in June: “The THAAD 
is an asset to help South Korea’s security, but it has not yet been reviewed.”104 
As soon as the South Korea-China summit ended, North Korea resumed its 
missile provocations from a location close to the South, where it moved westward and 
fired SRBMs from Hwangju. On July 12, 2014, the North fired SRBMs from Kaesong, 
very close to its border and less than 100 km from Seoul, further raising military tensions 
on the Korean Peninsula.105 (See Figure 4.) After that, North Korea was silent, making 
no further launches until February 2015, after launching SRBMs on September 1 and 6, 
2014.106 
On October 3, 2014, South Korea’s media made it public that the alliance was 
considering pushing for the deployment of the THAAD to the U.S. military base in 
Pyeongtaek regardless of China’s concerns, giving rise to questions about Seoul’s official 
response.107 In fact, the official response from the defense minister of South Korea and 
that of the United States had always been that there was no “official consultation” 
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regarding the deployment of the THAAD. It was also in conflict with the remarks of 
Robert Work, U.S. deputy secretary of defense: “We are carefully reviewing the 
deployment of the THAAD battery in South Korea and discussing it with the South 
Korean government.”108 
Additionally, on October 23, 2014, at the 46th SCM, Chuck Hagel, the U.S. 
defense secretary, said he had not yet reached a formal decision regarding the THAAD 
deployment. Even so, he did not completely deny the possibility of deployment. At a 
joint press conference, Hagel stressed the U.S. commitment to providing missile defense 
capabilities to South Korea.109 
Contrary to the wishes of the United States, South Korea’s President Park Geun-
Hye did not mention the THAAD issue at all in an official position, instead focusing on 
solving economic problems. Similar to the New Year’s message in 2014, President Park 
insisted in the New Year’s message in 2015 that the urgent task would be to revitalize a 
somewhat stagnant economy.110 She delayed these priorities by recognizing the issue of 
reunification with North Korea and the North Korean nuclear issue as a long-term 
assignment rather than an urgent task. 
South Korea’s stance was the same at the 2015 New Year Press Conference. It 
started with worrying about the leak of documents related to President Park Geun-Hye’s 
corruption. Also, President Park Geun-Hye stressed the efforts to remove obstacles to 
growth by changing institutions and practices in order to make the economy improve. 
Based on these efforts, she asked the public for their continued interest in and support for 
the “Three Year Plan for Economic Innovation.”111  
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At the 2015 press conference of President Park Geun-Hye, it was difficult to find 
any reference to preparations for North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations.112 As 
far as managing North Korea’s provocations that impeded economic development, the 
emphasis was only on strengthening both the ROK-U.S. alliance and Sino-Korean 
relations as “Strategic and Cooperative Partnerships.”113  Nowhere was did she make any 
mention of military assets or THAAD to defend North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
threats.  
In February 2015, Minister of National Defense Han Min-Koo used the term 
“strategic ambiguity” in connection with the THAAD issue at the National Assembly, 
which neither supported nor opposed the deployment of the U.S. THAAD system.114 As 
a result, the government’s ambiguous and unclear stance added to the confusion. South 
Korea’s official position was that the THAAD deployment was neither considered nor 
discussed with the United States. To be more specific, the South Korean government did 
not have a plan to deploy the THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, but if it deployed, it 
would possibly help counter North Korean missile threats. It was also that South Korea 
did not have any particular objection to the USFK’s deployment at the U.S. base. This 
unclear and ambiguous stance of Korea had added to the confusion not only at home but 
also internationally.  
The South Korean leader was also indifferent to the ruling party’s claim. Yoo 
Seung-Min, the ruling party floor leader, said that he would force a party-level 
publicization of the introduction of THAAD, further pressing the Blue House. The Blue 
House was consistent with the strategic ambiguity policy, defining the official opinion 
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through spokesman Min Kyung-Wok as its “3NO (No Request, No Consultation, No 
Decision) policy” regarding THAAD issues.115 
This strategy meant that the South Korean government had become aware that 
THAAD was needed. The ambiguous policy was an inevitable choice for a middle power 
state to manage the acquisition of security gains from the United States without 
disrupting economic gains from deepening relations with China.  
Table 4. South Korea’s strategic ambiguity 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat    
United States    
China Low Delay  
Policy-Maker   China 
Participation of the public    
 
3. North Korea’s Nuclear Test 
China pressured South Korea through various diplomatic channels, and the United 
States pressured South Korea through several pipelines, but South Korea did not change 
its position on THAAD. Nevertheless, after North Korea’s nuclear test, South Korea’s 
position rapidly leaned toward the deployment of THAAD.  
On March 16, 2015, China consistently raised its opposition to THAAD through 
several channels. After a meeting of vice foreign ministers of South Korea and China, the 
latter’s Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs Liu Zhenqiao expressed China’s concerns and 
worries in response to reporters’ questions regarding THAAD: “Please put importance on 
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China’s interest and concerns regarding the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,” and 
he urged, “I hope South Korea and the United States make a reasonable decision.”116 In 
addition, China’s defense ministers openly expressed concern over the possible 
deployment of the THAAD to the Korean Peninsula during their defense ministers’ 
talks. 117  Despite this persistent opposition, South Korea did not officially oppose 
THAAD. The ongoing pursuit of the “3No Policy” demonstrated this claim. 
On April 3, 2015, North Korea continued to launch SRBMs from Hodo Peninsula, 
demonstrating its missile technology to the international community and suggesting that 
it was developing a missile that could more efficiently target and strike the U.S. and 
South Korean military bases on the Korean Peninsula through the increased number of 
launches.118  
Meanwhile, the United States showed respect for South Korea’s autonomy related 
to deploying THAAD, but also put pressure on it at the same time. On April 10, 2015, in 
Seoul, Secretary of State Ashton Carter denied discussing THAAD deployment after the 
South Korea-U.S. defense ministers’ meeting. Nevertheless, later at the U.S. Senate 
Armed Services Committee, the U.S. commander in the Pacific Command (PACOM) 
noted that the United States was discussing the THAAD deployment in South Korea.119 
The South Korean government repeatedly argued through a spokesperson that there was 
no official request from the United States, no consultation, and no decision.120 
On September 14, 2015, Kim Kwan-Jin, head of the presidential National 
Security Office, drew attention as he embarked on his first trip to the United States since 
taking office. He disclosed to the press that he would discuss the North Korean nuclear 
issue and pending issues with the United States during his official visit to the United 
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States, which meant that a bilateral discussion on the THAAD issue would also be 
included.121  
On September 18, 2015, China immediately pressed South Korea, claiming in a 
column by an international relations expert who served as head of the international 
department of the party’s official newspaper, Renminbao, that Seoul should prevent 
damage to Beijing through the deployment of the U.S. MD. It also pointed out that the 
X-band radar could put China under the U.S. surveillance, and that South Korea was 
likely to be incorporated into the U.S.-led East Asian MD eventually.122 
Since February 2015, after adhering to the “3No Policy” of South Korea, the 
stance on THAAD had not changed. North Korea’s provocations had declined since 
February 2015, China had pressured South Korea through various diplomatic channels, 
and the United States pressured South Korea through several meetings and official 
comments, but South Korea did not change its position on THAAD.  
On May 8, 2015, North Korea conducted a test launch of KN-11, Pukkuksong-1, 
a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that when deployed could be launched 
from the sea and would be more difficult to detect than the ground-based missile.123 
Shortly after the test launch, the North’s Rodong newspaper and the Korean Central 
News Agency (KCNA) claimed that the development of KN-11 gave North Korea the 
ability to penetrate deeply into the enemy’s territorial waters and strike suddenly without 
being detected by the enemy.124 Nuclear weapons mounted on the SLBM were more 
threatening to all of Northeast Asia than to the Korean Peninsula because of their superior 
stealth and survivability compared to those of ground-based missiles. This was because 
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“minimum deterrence” with the SLBM was possible.125 In other words, as Tom Sauer 
argues, a country that seeks deterrence may have no ability to do more damage than its 
counterpart, but if it can do damage that can be expected to some extent, deterrence can 
be achieved despite its relatively weak capabilities. 126  Looking at North Korea’s 
problems from this perspective, it was evident that North Korea’s SLBM attack was 
inferior in terms of capability and power compared to the U.S. nuclear umbrella on the 
Korean Peninsula. Deterrence could be achieved, however, if the SLBM threat was 
enough to inhibit U.S. and ROK actions. Because of this deterrence capability, not only 
North Korea but also Britain and France are deploying nuclear weapons by making 
SLBMs.  
In response to North Korea’s provocations, the ROK MND immediately informed 
the public that it perceived North Korea’s missiles as a South Korean crisis and 
threatened to retaliate if North Korea committed any invasion.127 Still, official comments 
on THAAD were avoided. 
At the same time, China repeatedly opposed the THAAD decision, paying keen 
attention to Seoul’s and Washington’s reactions after North Korea’s provocations. China 
was wary of South Korea’s response. China had a negative opinion on North Korea’s 
SLBM development capability and argued that South Korea should not be used as a 
pretext for THAAD deployment.128 China, using expert opinions, stressed that North 
Korea did not have the capability to develop SLBM. Besides, they stressed that the 
countries that developed and owned SLBMs were only four states: the United States, 
Russia, France, and China.129 It also argued that it was difficult for North Korea to have 
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SLBM capabilities at the level these countries had.130 These arguments demonstrated 
that China was wary of South Korea’s THAAD deployment gaining momentum under 
the threat of North Korean missiles. 
Experts in the United States had put much analysis into the emergence of new 
threats from North Korea, and convinced that ultimately information sharing through the 
MD system was necessary. This assertion had given the power to deploy THAAD. The 
response from the United States experts was divided in favor of whether North Korea’s 
SLBM was a real threat to its alliances. On the one hand, Bruce W. Bennett, the senior 
international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation, insisted that North Korea was 
far from a real threat because the development of SLBM would require a high level of 
technical verification process, and North Korea did not yet have more than 3,000 tons of 
submarines capable of launching SLBM. 131 On the other hand, Bruce Klingner, the 
senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies 
Center, clearly asserted that North Korea was developing the SLBM, and also argued, as 
did many experts, that the United States should respond quickly to North Korea’s threats, 
in a matter of years rather than in ten or more years for deployment.132 He emphasized 
the importance of multi-layered defense systems through THAAD and information 
sharing between Korea and Japan. 
Meanwhile, North Korea test-launched the SLBM two more times on November 
28 and December 25, 2015, and North Korea continued to show its commitment to the 
SLBM’s development to the international community.133  
South Korea and the United States were concerned about North Korean 
development of SLBM delivery means for nuclear weapons. This hostile action sparked 
the debate among many South Korean and the U.S. military experts, and China was also 
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concerned about THAAD gaining momentum in response. Although South Korea 
acknowledged that it could be at risk due to the increased threat from North Korea, the 
South Korean government did not mention or change its position on the deployment of 
THAAD. 
On January 6, 2016, North Korea announced that it had successfully tested the 
“hydrogen bomb” through its fourth nuclear test, and it would continue its policy of 
promoting both nuclear and economic development.134 It also made clear that North 
Korea would not suspend or abandon its nuclear weapons program unless the United 
States halted its “hostile policy” against North Korea.135 Some experts said the North’s 
claimed test of a hydrogen bomb was a failure given its nuclear-weapons explosive 
power of only 7–10 kilotons, which was lower than other hydrogen bombs or 
thermonuclear tests. Nevertheless, other experts argued that even if it was an experiment 
with less destructive power than a hydrogen bomb, it should be clearly recognized that 
North Korea was in the process of developing a hydrogen bomb.136 While many experts 
discussed the extent to which North Korea’s nuclear test improved the country’s nuclear 
weapons production capacity, it should be clearly recognized that a failed nuclear test 
was still likely to provide useful information to the North Korea’s scientists to help them 
achieve that goal. The threat of North Korea’s nuclear program would only be heightened 
if it was achieved by testing a thermonuclear device or a two-phase explosion that had 
been tested only in the United States, Russia, France, and China. 
Immediately after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, China’s response was quite 
critical and immediate. On January 7, 2016, one day after the nuclear test, the Chinese 
government’s official position was announced by the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
representative Hua Chunying, who said, “We strongly oppose North Korea’s nuclear test, 
                                                 
134 Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “North Korea’s January 6, 2016, Nuclear Test,” Insight No. IN10428 





which is disadvantageous for the normal development of our bilateral relations.” 137 
China’s position was repeated by Hong Lei on January 16, 2016. Hong Lei supported the 
UN Security Council’s stance against North Korea’s nuclear test and stated that it should 
implement denuclearization, prevent proliferation, and maintain peace in Northeast 
Asia.138 China’s actual actions, however, were not significantly different from those after 
North Korea’s third nuclear test, and only repeated arguments for peaceful resolution of 
the North Korean nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks, while maintaining a 
traditionally friendly relationship with North Korea.139 
After North Korea’s nuclear test, South Korea’s position rapidly leaned toward 
the deployment of THAAD. In line with China’s criticism of North Korea, President Park 
Geun-Hye officially announced to the international community at the New Year’s press 
conference on January 13 that South Korea would review THAAD in accordance with 
South Korea’s security and national interests.140 The President’s remarks declared the 
starting point for the official THAAD discussion in South Korea, which had been 
maintaining a strategic ambiguity through the “3No Policy.” It officially said President 
Park considered the deployment of the THAAD as a self-defense measure because the 
escalating threat from North Korea had too much impact on the survival of the South 
Korean people and the security of the nation.141 
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At the same time, the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
report played a role in solidifying the U.S. position and indirectly conveying the U.S. 
opinion to South Korea. On January 19, 2016, THAAD deployments received momentum 
from the U.S. CSIS report. Because, according to CSIS’s analysis, they recommended the 
U.S. DOD to deploy THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. CSIS’s think tank concluded that 
the United States should strengthen regional MD capability through the deployment of 
THAAD.142 
Meanwhile, domestic public opinion, which had remained silent despite the 
continued threat from North Korea, responded differently to North Korea’s nuclear test, 
empowering politicians who advocated South Korea’s nuclear armament. Public opinion 
among South Koreans also expressed concern about North Korea’s nuclear development 
and the opinion that the North Korean nuclear issue should be dealt with through South 
Korea’s nuclear armament rather than the ROK-U.S. alliance in order to balance power. 
According to a survey conducted from January 12 to 14, 2016, 54% of South Korean 
adults supported demands for ROK’s nuclear armament. 143  Also, thanks to this 
momentum, Saenuri Party floor leader, Won Yoo-Chul, and Saenuri Party’s Supreme 
Council member, Kim Eul-Dong, maintained that South Korea’s nuclear armament was 
inevitable and that the fate of the state should no longer rely upon the U.S. promise.144 
This argument came from the ruling party and attracted much attention. 
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Table 5. North Korea’s nuclear test. 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat High Accelerate  
United States   North Korea 
China   North Korea 
Policy-Maker   North Korea 
Participation of the public   North Korea 
 
4. President Park’s Changed Perception of THAAD 
After North Korea’s nuclear test, China’s passive attitude toward North Korea 
failed to meet the South Korean president’s expectations, which contributed to the change 
in the South Korean president’s perception of THAAD. 
On February 5, 2016, one month after North Korea’s nuclear test, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping called President Park Geun-Hye to discuss North Korea’s long-
range missile launch and sanctions against the North Korean regime, and he also 
discussed these same issues with President Barack Obama. 145  The telephone 
conversation between these nations’ leaders, which had not occurred since North Korea’s 
first nuclear test, and the U.S. and China’s cooperation, was significant because it was the 
first time since the North Korea’s fourth nuclear test. Nonetheless, it did not translate into 
sanctions on North Korea.  
Despite these historical events, President Park was disappointed with Xi Jinping’s 
attitude to deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations, and expressed 
disappointment to the Blue House cabinet staff, saying, “Do not expect any more from 
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China’s role.”146 This was because China continued to be passive in sanctions against 
North Korea after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, and it was only a month after 
delaying South Korea’s request for rapid conversation after the fourth nuclear test.147 
Besides, North Korea’s alleged hydrogen bomb test caused a drastic change in the South 
Korean leader’s attitude toward THAAD. The official remarks by President Park 
demonstrated this change, which declared the starting point for THAAD deployment. At 
the same time, it meant the annulment of the “3NO Policy.” 
Table 6. President Park’s changed perception of THAAD. 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat    
United States    
China    
Policy-Maker High Accelerate  
Participation of the public    
 
5. North Korea’s Launch of Unha-3 
After North Korea’s nuclear test, its launch of Unha-3 helped further consolidate 
South Korea’s decision. It inevitably provoked external factors, especially the United 
States and China, but did not affect the leader of South Korea. On the other hand, North 
Korea’s provocations stimulated to the public, a domestic factor. 
China continued to press South Korea over the fear of momentum from North 
Korea’s aggressive provocation, but China could not overturn South Korea’s decision. 
This was because of the following reasons: 1) China’s passive stance toward North Korea 




and 2) China’s adherence to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through the 
Six-Party Talks. Meanwhile, the United States waited for South Korea’s decision, rather 
than pressuring South Korea or trampling its autonomy through official remarks or visits 
after North Korea’s nuclear test.  
On February 2, 2016, sudden notifications of North Korea’s “Kwangmyongsong-
4 satellite, Unha-3,” launch again stimulated other countries in Northeast Asia. After the 
nuclear test, North Korea informed the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) of their satellite launch plans. 148 
According to the IMO, North Korea was about to launch approximately one to three 
weeks later. Despite concerns in the United States and Northeast Asian countries, North 
Korea launched the Unha-3, long-range rocket, and Taepodong-2 on February 7, less than 
a month after the nuclear test, and the North Korean National Aerospace Development 
Administration announced that the satellite successfully entered its orbit.149 
After North Korea’s nuclear test, additional provocations of long-range missiles 
helped further consolidate South Korea’s decision. South Korea’s Defense Minister, Han 
Min-Gu, said in an emergency meeting held at the National Assembly following the 
launch of North Korea’s long-range missiles, the ROK Department of National Defense 
would begin discussions with the USFK concerning THAAD. However, he said the 
formation of a formal consultative body or ROK-U.S. working group was not 
completed.150 This was an opportunity to officially inform the lawmakers of the ROK’s 
intentions and to display the ROK’s growing willingness to deploy THAAD. 
Meanwhile, North Korea’s launch of Unha-3 provoked external factors, especially 
the United States and China, but did not affect the domestic factor, the leader of South 
                                                 
148 “这次真要上天:朝鲜通报本月将发卫星 [The North Informed Us that This Month We Will Send 
Satellite to the Moon],” 环球时报, February 3, 2016, 
http://w.huanqiu.com/r/MV8wXzg0OTY4NjNfNDhfMTQ1NDQ2MDY2MA==. 
149 “North Korea Fires Long-range Rocket despite Warning,” BBC, February 7, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35515207. 
150 Shin young Lee, “han-min-kwu “han-ps-mi, sa-tu pay-chi kong-sik hyep-uy wi-han hyep-uy cin-
hayng-cwung [Han, Min-Koo “South Korea and U.S. Talks underway for Official Consultation”], Yonhap 
News, February 18, 2016, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20160218051000001. 
53 
Korea. North Korea’s provocations, however, had been a stimulus to the public, a 
domestic factor, and a survey conducted by MBC demonstrated these facts. 151 This 
public opinion also served as a source of political support for South Korea’s leader, who 
talked THAAD in January.    
North Korea’s provocation of long-range missiles was a new security concern for 
the United States. The reasons for this were as follows: 1) North Korea’s new 
provocation was aimed at the mainland of the United States, rather than at the Korean 
Peninsula. 2) There was controversy over re-entry technology, but this kind of repetitive 
experiment helped North Korea’s technological development of ICBMs. (See Figure 4.) 
Due to these reasons, the United States had been keenly responding to the provocation 
since the announcement of North Korea’s Unha-3(Taepodong-2) launch plan. 
  
Figure 4. North Korea’s Missile Range152 
                                                 
151 Jaejin Lee, “sa-tu-pay-chi chan-seng-i 70% [70% for THAAD Deployment? MBC Poll, Wrong 
Question.],” Media Today, February 11, 2015, 
http://www.mediatoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=127948. 
152 Source: Nicole Mortillaro, “Just a Matter of Time’: North Korea’s Missile Capabilities May Be 
Closer that Once Thought,” CBC News, November 30, 2017, https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/north-
korea-missiles-reach-north-america-1.4424511. 
54 
At the same time, the U.S. Department of State representative Kirby, referring to 
North Korea’s “satellite” launch, insisted that the international community needed to put 
more pressure on North Korea.153 In addition, Mr. Kirby pressured North Korea at a 
press conference, stating that the UN Security Council was considering further sanctions 
on North Korea and that the United States was considering sanctions on its own.154  
Like the United States, China urged North Korea to suspend its “satellite” launch 
plan as tensions in Northeast Asia increased due to North Korea’s nuclear test. 
Nevertheless, China’s attitude did not contribute to the THAAD decision itself. China’s 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Lukang expressed concern in China over North Korea’s 
“satellite” launch plan at a regular briefing while also expressing concerns over the 
deployment of THAAD in South Korea. 155  Through his official statement, China 
pressured both North Korea and South Korea at the same time. China judged that if North 
Korea again provoked the international community’s attention with a nuclear test, it 
would give an essential card to hard-liners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan. 
South Korea’s leader was less talkative in responding to North Korea’s new 
provocations, but the public supported THAAD. A Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation 
(MBC) survey showed that South Korean public opinion had been leaning more toward 
THAAD deployment. According to MBC’s survey, 67.8 % of the people agreed to the 
need for THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula. 156 These results had drawn 
attention to public opinion that could be seen amid North Korea’s continued threats. 
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Table 7. North Korea’s launch of Unha-3. 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat Low Accelerate  
United States   North Korea 
China   North Korea 
Policy-Maker    
Participation of the public   North Korea 
 
6. The ROK-U.S. Alliance’s THAAD Decision  
China and the United States sought to use the pending THAAD decision for 
mutual strategic interests. On the one hand, the United States tried to pressure China to 
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, and on the other, it sought to deploy THAAD 
through cooperation with South Korea. China tried to pressure South Korea directly to 
withdraw the deployment of THAAD. But, the South Korean government did not change 
its decision posture regarding THAAD. 
On February 7, South Korea and the United States announced publicly that they 
would officially begin discussions on South Korea’s THAAD deployment. 157 
Considering China’s concerns regarding THAAD, the U.S. DOD notified China in 
advance before the announcement. It made clear that THAAD would only be used to 
intercept North Korean missiles.158  
At the same time, South Korean Deputy Minister for Defense Policy Ryu Je-
Seung argued that the deployment of THAAD, the most advanced defensive weapon 
currently available to North Korea’s continuing nuclear and missile threats, should be 
                                                 





taken into account.159 This was because a single THAAD battery could defend a large 
area of South Korea. At the same time, he tried not to provoke China, clearly stressing 
that it was brought by the USFK, not by South Korea buying and using the THAAD.160 
After announcing official discussion, President Park also showed active support 
for the MND’s stance on THAAD, and a Blue House foreign affairs official claimed that 
President Park’s sense of disappointment and anger toward China, which had built trust 
through participation in the China Victory Day Parade in 2015 despite the U.S. concerns, 
played a significant role in the shift in perception.161 
Meanwhile, public opinion had been in favor of THAAD deployment, which led 
leaders to add political power to the domestic controversy over THAAD. Yet, there had 
been no in-depth discussion of the THAAD deployment area. As the THAAD 
deployment discussion had risen to the surface, Pyeongtaek, Daegu, Chilgok, and Wonju 
were considered as the deployment sites; among them, Daegu was known to be the most 
likely location to deploy the THAAD.162 Even as politicians of the ruling Saenuri Party 
and citizens of candidate sites maintained their support for the deployment, the 
deployment of the THAAD had begun to be passed on to other regions. Unfortunately, 
because the candidates for the THAAD deployment were the districts of the ruling party 
legislators, the Saenuri parliamentarians had difficulty supporting the government’s 
position unconditionally.163 
According to Cheong Seong-Chang, a senior research fellow at Sejong Institute in 
South Korea, the reason for this happening was that Seoul and Washington approached 
the THAAD problem differently. In detail, while the United States tried to take a flexible 
approach with the intention of opening up the possibility of compromise with China, 
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South Korea desperately intended to deploy THAAD.164 For example, on February 23, 
2016, before the launch of the ROK-U.S. Joint Working Group, U.S. Secretary of State 
John Kerry said that “THAAD deployment has not yet been decided,” and asserted that 
THAAD would be not necessary if China appeared to be a bit more responsible for North 
Korea’s denuclearization after a meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China.165 Additionally, at a press conference held on February 25, 
2016, in the U.S. DOD, Harry B. Harris Jr., Commander, U.S. PACOM, said that a 
formal discussion between the United States and the ROK on THAAD deployment did 
not necessarily mean that it should be deployed. 166  His remarks meant that the 
deployment of THAAD had not yet been decided, and South Korea’s concerns deepened. 
As the ROK-U.S. discussions of THAAD deployments were formalized, China 
began to voice its opposition in a stronger tone. First of all, Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign 
Minister, even used the word “revenge” to claim that South Korea was threatening China 
with a knife backed by the United States.167 He argued that THAAD was aiming at 
China and voiced that China’s legitimate security interests must be guaranteed in 
resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. 168  Second, Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang 
Yesui, who attended a high-level South Korea-China diplomatic strategy conference in 
Seoul, expressed clear opposition from China on the grounds that South Korea’s decision 
on THAAD increased tensions in East Asia and undermined China’s strategic security 
                                                 
164 Min-sik Yoon, “Korea, U.S. Launch Formal THAAD Talks,” The Korea Herald, March 4, 2016, 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160304000689. 
165 Byungsoo Park, “mi-kwuk sa-tu pay-chi a-cik kyel-ceng an-twayss-ta han-kwuk o-li-al- toy-na 
[U.S. “The THAAD Deployment Has Yet to be Decided.” Is Korea a Duck Egg?],” The Hankyoreh, 
February 24, 2016. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/731948.html. 
166 “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Harris in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. 
Department of Defense, February 25, 2016, 
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/673426/department-of-defense-press-
briefing-by-adm-harris-in-the-pentagon-briefing-room/. 
167 Yong Hyun Ahn, “sa-tu-nun yu-pang-ul kye-nwu-nun hang-wu-uy khal-chwum [The Sword Dance 




interests.169 Third, China, citing the opinions of air force experts, argued that China’s 
space activity would be monitored by the U.S. military assets in South Korea. In other 
words, it was a direct security threat to China, and they claimed that the potential threat 
posed by the U.S. military following the deployment of the THAAD seriously 
undermined the strategic balance of East Asia.170 The reason was that if the United 
States pushed ahead with the deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea based on 
its ballistic missile strike capabilities to create a complete chain of MD in East Asia, it 
would significantly weaken China’s nuclear deterrence capability.171 In short, it would 
lead to the U.S. unilateral strategic dominance in East Asia.172  
Until February 23, 2016, due to strong opposition from China, South Korea and 
the United States were hesitant to prepare for THAAD deployment. South Korea and the 
United States had not launched a ROK-U.S. Joint Working Group for more than two 
weeks after the declaration of formal consultations on THAAD deployment. Finally, it 
was planned to sign the ROK-U.S. Joint Working Group agreement on February 23, 2016, 
but it was canceled due to opposition from the United States just hours before the 
announcement of the official talks.173 China’s leader, Xi Jinping, attended the fourth 
Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and held summit talks with the U.S. President 
Obama. At this point, Xi Jinping conveyed to the U.S. President his opposition to the 
deployment of the THAAD system in South Korea, putting the issue of South Korea’s 
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THAAD deployment on the main agenda.174 It was the first time Xi Jinping expressed 
his opposition in an official position. 
On March 4, 2016, despite hesitation from the United States, South Korea and the 
United States exchanged agreements to form a joint working group on THAAD 
deployment.175 After signing the agreement, the joint working group immediately met to 
discuss the location of THAAD, safety issues, cost-sharing, and the timeline for further 
talks.  
On March 10, 2016, six days after the U.S. and South Korean THAAD 
discussions began in earnest, North Korea launched two SRBMs over the East Sea and 
announced that it would liquidate all South Korean assets in the country.176 Pyongyang 
spoke in a speech by the spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of 
Korea (CPRK), which claimed that it would completely liquidate all assets of South 
Korean companies and related institutions in North Korea. North Korea also sought to 
inflict further political, military, and economic damage on South Korea. 177 Military 
provocations continued as if to prove their claim. On March 18, North Korea launched 
two medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), the Rodong missiles, from Sunchon 
Airbase.178 
In April 2016, though North Korea’s Musudan missiles test failed repeatedly, it 
was enough to stimulate the security efforts of neighboring countries. North Korea 
concentrated on the test of the Musudan missile, but the initial April 15 and 28 tests 
failed. In addition, the April 23 SLBM experiment only carried 19 miles, too short to be a 
success.179 
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Although China’s Wang Yi, Zhan Yesui, and others strongly expressed China’s 
opposition to the THAAD, and the United States tried to use it as leverage against North 
Korea’s denuclearization rather than actively supporting South Korea’s THAAD 
deployment, the South Korean government did not change its decision posture regarding 
THAAD.  
On June 4, 2016, South Korea’s Minister of National Defense, Min-Koo Han, 
while attending the Asian Security Conference in Singapore, formally informed the 
media of Seoul’s intention to deploy the THAAD. He insisted that the ROK’s missile 
defense assets were focused solely on defending the lower layers, which would be useful 
militarily if THAAD were deployed. This was because THAAD would make South 
Korea’s multi-layered missile defense capability possible. 180  He implied that issues 
related to the THAAD deployment would be announced soon, saying that South Korea 
and the United States were jointly reviewing the location, timing, and cost of the 
deployment. 
Meanwhile, North Korea continued to launch Musudan missiles, threatening not 
only the Korean Peninsula but also Japan. North Korea continued to focus on Musudan 
missile tests in June but failed to show significant results to the international community. 
In the midst of failure, the second of the Musudan missiles launched on June 22, 2016, 
the missile flew 249 miles, which was farther than the previous missiles, and dropped 
into the East Sea.181 The South Korean government briefed the people in response to 
North Korea’s provocations, but there was no mention of the THAAD timeline.  
Immediately, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe strongly protested that North 
Korea’s provocations harmed Japan’s security, and Dave Benham of the U.S. PACOM 
argued that North Korean missiles were not a threat to North America. 182  These 
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comments, in turn, revealed that North Korea’s ongoing missile tests were affecting 
Japan and the U.S. security and that both countries were concerned about the possibility 
of North Korean missiles reaching their territory.183  
On July 8, 2016, South Korea and the United States, after much discussion, 
finally decided to deploy THAAD on the Korean Peninsula.184 Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, 
the commander of USFK, said the THAAD placement decision was a significant decision 
for the alliance that has continued since the Korean War. At the same time, he noted that 
the driving force for this decision was the continued development of North Korean 
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.185 He also made clear that THAAD 
would be focused solely on North Korea, taking into account China’s concerns. 
Nonetheless, it was still unsettling for the people of the deployment candidate sites that 
the only considerations for the location of the THAAD system would be ensuring the 
utility, environment, health, and safety of the THAAD system.186 
After its decision, China immediately requested through a diplomatic statement 
that the deployment of this system be halted. China claimed this was because the 
capabilities of AN/TPY-2 X-Band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar 
systems, which are part of the THAAD system, exceed the capabilities needed to defend 
the Korean Peninsula, and the deployment of THAAD would enhance the U.S. 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities around the Korean 
Peninsula.187 
Also, North Korea was very sensitive to sanctions by the United States. The 
THAAD announcement came shortly after the United States put North Korean leader 
Kim Jong-Un on the new sanction list for the first time, and the North’s reaction was 
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naturally intense. The North’s KCNA news agency said North Korea recognized the 
sanctions list upgrade as a “declaration of war with North Korea.”188  
The active support of the leader played an essential role in THAAD’s decision, 
but questions were raised about the decision-making process. Kim Jong-Dae, a member 
of the South Korea National Assembly, claimed that the decision was made through 
direct contact between the Blue House National Security Office and the USFK without 
going through the Defense Ministry.189 He released the fact that he had met and spoke 
with the MND and announced that Blue House had a National Security Council (NSC) 
Standing Committee and decided on THAAD deployment urgently.190 This indicated 
that President Park’s will was deeply involved in the THAAD deployment decision, and 
it was evidence that Park’s administration dealt directly with the United States, not taking 
the decision of THAAD deployment through a wide range of discussions with specialized 
institutions.  
Despite China’s continued opposition, South Korea decided to deploy THAAD. 
Its decision-making process, however, caused controversy. The indications that the final 
decision was made solely at the presidential level, without participation of other 
governmental institutions, indicates how leadership preference played a critical role in the 
decision.  
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Table 8. THAAD decision by the ROK-U.S. alliance. 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat Low Accelerate  
United States    
China    
Policy-Maker High Accelerate United States 
Participation of the public    
 
B. CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE 
This chapter focused on South Korea’s THAAD decision and has identified which 
factors influenced its decision from the time the THAAD debate began in South Korea to 
the deployment decision. The conclusion of this chapter is summarized in Table 9. North 
Korea’s nuclear threat most affected South Korea’s THAAD decision, followed by South 
Korea’s policy-makers and changes in pressure from the United States and China. On the 
other hand, it appears that the political participation of the public contributed little to the 
decision among the domestic factors. 
The first primary conclusion is that South Korea’s THAAD decision was most 
affected by North Korea’s nuclear threat. The increasing threat from North Korea 
presented security concerns to the South Korean government, and had been a factor in 
stimulating the United States to put pressure on South Korea. To reach this conclusion, 
this chapter first looked at North Korea’s nuclear ambition before the controversy began 
and, based on its starting point, examined North Korea’s ongoing threat changes under 
the Kim Jong Un regime and South Korea’s response. 
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Table 9. Analysis of the first phase. 
 External Factors Domestic Factors 
1st Phase N. Korea U.S. China Leader Public 
Rodong Test Accelerate     
Strategic Ambiguity   Delay   
Nuclear Test Accelerate      
Leader’s perception    Accelerate  
Unha-3 Launch Accelerate      
THAAD Decision Accelerate    Accelerate  
Key: In the table, red: high, yellow: low,           : dependence 
 
North Korea had increased its provocations through nuclear and missile tests, 
which threatened the United States as well as South Korea, since 2014 when THAAD 
discussions began in earnest. The rapid increase in these threats prompted the United 
States to continue to pressure South Korea’s resolve and autonomy in an asymmetric 
alliance. Besides, these persistent and rapidly increasing North Korean nuclear and 
missile threats contributed to the THAAD decision. 
As discussed previously, under the Kim Jong-Un regime, North Korea conducted 
18 nuclear and missile launches in 2014 and 2015, and 23 in 2016, until the decision to 
deploy THAAD. This number is almost the same as the sum of 63 launches under the 
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-Il regimes. 191  These numbers are much higher when 
combined with Kim Jong-Un’s early days of 2012 and 2013. Kim Jong-Un further 
strengthened his will to develop nuclear weapons through a nuclear test, and as a result, 
the number of 10 to 16 estimated weapons in 2014 increased to 14 to 22 in 2016.192  
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In addition, North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un made efforts to miniaturize and lighten 
the nuclear warheads. Along with these efforts, in order to develop its capabilities, North 
Korea conducted many tests of the Rodong with a range of 1,200 to 1,500 km, Musudan 
of 2,500 to 4,000 km, and Taeposong-2 of 4,000 to 15,000 km. 
Additionally, since 2015, the test launches of SLBMs have continued to increase 
the tension on the Korean Peninsula. 193 Concerns about North Korea’s nuclear and 
missile capabilities has continued not only within the Korean Peninsula but also aimed at 
the U.S. mainland. In March 2016, the U.S. Admiral William Gortney, commander of 
U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), cited concerns about North Korea’s missile 
capability in Congress, insisting that Hwasung-13, KN-08, could pose a nuclear threat to 
many parts of the United States.194 
Additionally, entering 2014, North Korea drastically modified its missile-testing 
pattern, firing far more often and launching from various places. 195  Looking more 
closely, one notes that North Korea created many testing sites elsewhere for 
developmental testing of missiles, without using the existing frequently used the Tonghae 
Satellite Launching Ground. Furthermore, unlike during the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il 
regimes, operational tests were conducted at multiple military operation bases rather than 
focusing on missile development only.196 This change in North Korea is an essential 
factor that shows the strategic importance of the development program under the Kim 
Jong-Un regime, which has caused much concern for the ROK-U.S. alliance. This is due 
to the fact that as the launch site is continually changed, it requires a great deal of 
attention and monitoring in advance for the ROK-U.S. alliance to detect and identify 
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missile launches, and the alliance has failed to identify the exact location of some launch 
experiments immediately after launch.197 
The second primary conclusion is that South Korea continued to delay THAAD’s 
formal discussion with the United States due to South Korea’s political and economic 
relations with China. Nevertheless, the immediate threat from North Korea overrode 
external pressure from China. According to realists, the deployment of THAAD is a form 
of external balance. This is because THAAD is the property of the United States, 
operated by U.S. military order, and represents the commitment of the extended 
deterrence promised by the United States. The rapid increase in North Korea’s threats put 
pressure on South Korea in the asymmetric ROK-U.S. alliance described earlier, with the 
U.S. officials’ talks about THAAD, visits by senior U.S. government officials, and the 
need for missile defense expressed by U.S. military generals. Eventually, in the 
asymmetrical alliance structure between South Korea and the United States, U.S. demand 
for THAAD deployment would influence South Korea’s decision to deploy THAAD. If 
South Korea did not meet the THAAD deployment desired by the United States, it could 
increase the risk of weakening the alliance relationship with the United States, and 
increase the possibility of abandonment by the United States. 
China judged that the X-Band radar mounted on the THAAD could be aimed at 
China, and continuously expressed its interests and concern regarding its deployment on 
the Korean Peninsula. Even China’s Xi Jinping was serious enough to talk directly to 
President Park Geun-Hye and to the president of the United States. In response to China’s 
continued expression of concern, South Korea maintained strategic ambiguity with its 
“3No Policy,” but that stance did not last long. In addition, unlike the South Korean and 
U.S. perceptions and concerns after North Korea’s nuclear test, China did not show any 
change in its position to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in the 
framework of the existing Six-Party Talks. Finally, South Korean President Park Geun-
Hye, who had expected a change in China’s role in resolving the North Korean nuclear 
issue, was disappointed and began to discuss the THAAD in earnest. 
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The third primary conclusion is that South Korea’s conservative regime, led by 
President Park Geun-Hye, changed its perception of national interests through the policy 
of strategic ambiguity, contributing much to the decision of THAAD. This is because the 
president has the greatest authority in the decision-making process in South Korea. The 
comments of the leader who supported the deployment of THAAD rapidly after North 
Korea’s nuclear test support this assertion. To understand the South Korean government’s 
decision, it is necessary to analyze President Park’s perception of North Korea’s nuclear 
and missile issues. There is no reference to THAAD in the official statements of 
President Park Geun-Hye in 2014 and 2015. It was the New Year’s press conference on 
January 13, 2016, when Park’s administration first mentioned both THAAD and North 
Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. President Park Geun-Hye officially stated, “We will 
consider North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats and consider THAAD issues 
according to our security and national interests.”198 The Blue House’s position on the 
deployment of THAAD, which had been consistent with the strategic ambiguity of policy 
with the “3NO Policy” on this issue until the end of 2015, officially began to change as it 
entered 2016. 199  The change in the decision-maker’s threat perception served as a 
significant turning point for the United States and South Korea to begin formal 
consultations on the deployment of THAAD on February 7, 2016.200 
After deciding to deploy THAAD on July 21, 2016, President Park Geun-Hye 
presided over the NSC and stated, “If there are other ways to protect our people from 
North Korean missile attacks besides THAAD deployment, please suggest.”201 These 
arguments represent the Park Geun-Hye administration’s changing threat perception, 
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which means she recognized the fact that not only North Korea’s threat had increased 
significantly, but the reliability of North Korean missile threat had also increased. 
In summary, North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats increased very rapidly 
from 2014 to 2016, and North Korea’s fourth nuclear test led to a shift in the South 
Korean government’s position on THAAD. Despite the dynamic security environment in 
East Asia, China was concerned about the U.S. assets being placed on the Korean 
Peninsula rather than resolving North Korea issues. In order to change China’s attitude, 
South Korea and the United States strategically delayed the decision on THAAD, but in 
response to China’s passive attitude toward North Korea, the United States and South 
Korea inevitably played the THAAD card. North Korea’s continued nuclear and missile 
provocations led to South Korea’s need for external balance through the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella despite reliability factors and justification for its internal balance. These factors 
drove South Korea’s decision to adopt THAAD. President Park Geun-Hye’s shift in 
perception after North Korea’s nuclear test highly influenced this outcome. The 
accumulation of these effects led to an overall acceleration of the THAAD decision, as 
depicted in Figure 5.  
To understand the issues associated with THAAD in more depth, it is necessary to 
examine how the independent variables worked from the decision until the actual 
equipment was brought in and placed in the deployment area. The selection of a 
deployment area for THAAD in South Korea and the timing of deployment further 
increased the controversy even after the THAAD decision was made. THAAD’s 
emergence as a controversial political issue, coupled with the issue of the president’s 
corruption and impeachment, led political parties to fuel the controversy in order to 
benefit from it. Chapter IV examines which independent variables influenced the timing 
of THAAD deployment after the decision was made to deploy the system. 
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Figure 5. South Korea and THAAD – from initiation to decision. 
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IV. SOUTH KOREA AND THAAD: FROM DECISION TO 
DEPLOYMENT 
According to South Korea’s 2016 Defense White Paper, the THAAD system 
deployed in Korea is a THAAD battery, consisting of a turret control station, one fire 
control radar, six launchers, and 48 interceptor missiles.202 As for the timing of the 
deployment, the 2016 Defense White Paper stipulates that it should occur within 2017, 
and according to the announcement of the ROK-U.S. alliance, they planned to deploy by 
the end of 2017.203  
Based on these two sources, this chapter sets the point at which the THAAD 
deployment should have been complete at the end of 2017. This chapter analyzes the 
development that led to the THAAD deployment being accelerated or delayed in the 
second phase, from the decision to adopt THAAD to the appearance of President Moon’s 
administration on May 9, 2017. The chapter examines the roles of the five independent 
variables: 1) the changes in pressure of the US, 2) the changes in pressure by China 
driving external structural changes in South Korea, 3) the increased nuclear threat from 
North Korea, 4) the influence of conservative South Korean policy-makers, and 5) the 
South Korean public’s political participation. The chapter examines which factor most 
influenced the dependent variable in this phase of the THAAD issue, and reveals how the 
five factors interacted with each other during the second phase. Finally, the chapter 
analyzes the relationship and overall significance of each variable. The investigation 
finds that the public factor contributed to the delay early on, but North Korea’s nuclear 
tests and U.S. pressures overrode it later on.  
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A. FROM THE DECISION TO START ITS DEPLOYMENT 
1. Announcement of Seongju as the Deployment Site 
The announcement of Seongju as the THAAD deployment site caused anger 
among the residents of the province, and the South Korean government responded to this 
anger in a confusing manner.  
On July 12, 2016, the South Korean Ministry of Defense announced that it had 
established Seongju as the site for the THAAD system.204 The announcement came only 
a week after the THAAD deployment was decided. In announcing the deployment site, 
the South Korean government was concerned about a backlash from local residents rather 
than from the governments of China and North Korea, and the ministry’s statement 
demonstrates the claim. South Korean Deputy Minister for Defense Policy, Ryu Je-Seung, 
announced that the THAAD site had been reviewed and considered the following factors: 
1) maximizing the military’s effectiveness and 2) ensuring the safety of local citizens. 
Also, at the end of the announcement, he begged the locals to understand the country’s 
decision, considering the opposition of local people.205  
Meanwhile, most members of the ruling party did not oppose the THAAD 
deployment after the government’s announcement, but there were conflicting opinions 
and opposition parties opposed it for political gain. Twenty-one ruling parliamentarians 
from the region and surrounding areas of THAAD insisted that economic incentives 
should be provided to residents at the site of the THAAD, but the ruling party’s Yoo 
Seung-Min, who had Daegu as a regional district, did not agree with the local 
population’s expectations. He argued that residents have to tolerate its deployment as a 
measure to ensure national security. 
On the other hand, several members of the opposition Democratic Party had a 
strong objection to the THAAD deployment, and lawmaker Moon Jae-In argued that the 
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THAAD decision was more than a gain in terms of national interest.206 Other opposition 
parties, such as the People’s Party and the Justice Party, called for the withdrawal of the 
government’s THAAD decision, and the next presidential candidate, Ahn Cheol-Soo, 
proposed a referendum. He also called on the government to consult the National 
Assembly for future THAAD decisions.  
This disagreement between the ruling and opposition parties in the presidential 
system in Korea is one of the main features of the decision-making process, and the 
THAAD issue was a strategy to attract the public’s attention as it concentrated on the 
presidential election.207 In this winner-take-all system, politics easily becomes a zero-
sum game, making tolerance and compromise difficult. Because of this feature, political 
parties in South Korea used all the social and political issues available as tools for 
fighting to take power and focused on the fighting itself.208  
South Koreans generally wanted THAAD, except in Seongju. Residents of 
Seongju County and local government officials there began to fight back. As soon as the 
THAAD site was announced, more than 5,000 citizens gathered for demonstrations, 
which continued through the evening with candlelight demonstrations.209   
By contrast, citizens outside the Seongju region supported the THAAD 
deployment, contrary to the wishes of the residents of the affected region. According to 
Gallup Korea, 50% of the respondents agreed with the THAAD deployment, while 38% 
agreed with the opposition.210 In addition, 46% of people expressed their opinion that 
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THAAD would be accepted even if it were located near their area.211 Although it was 
judged that the reliability of the answer was not accurate because it was an opinion after 
the THAAD deployment area was already confirmed as Seongju, it was clear that public 
opinion still supported the THAAD decision.   
Encouraged by this public opinion, President Park pressured the residents of 
Seongju County. President Park Geun-Hye convened the NSC on July 13 and told the 
people to stop unnecessary debate over the THAAD placement decision process, hazards, 
and efficacy, and to follow the decision of the state.212 She gave the following reasons as 
a basis for her claim: 1) THAAD deployment was a matter of national security and public 
safety, making it impossible to disclose the decision-making process, and 2) THAAD 
needed to be deployed in a hurry due to North Korea’s threat.213  
Residents in Seongju did not agree with the government’s explanations. One day 
later, on July 14, South Korea’s prime minister visited Seongju to persuade Seongju 
residents, but he was trapped in a bus for six hours because of the revolts by angry 
residents. Only after the police had been dispatched could he escape.214  
The government’s response at the time of the announcement of Seongju as a 
THAAD placement site clearly showed that the Korean government was hesitant because 
of the opposition of the residents. The defense minister said he had no plans to announce 
the THAAD site until November 11. Yet, the South Korean government said it would 
announce the site on July 12. Before the announcement, the MND appeared confused by 
canceling and reversing the announcement because residents in Seongju did not 
participate in the announcement presentation.  
There had even been suspicions that the defense minister did not know about the 
site presentation plan. These confusing actions of the Korean government indicated that 
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the government was quite concerned about the people’s opposition. The fact that the 
government pushed ahead with the announcement of the THAAD deployment, however, 
showed its readiness to confront that public opposition, perhaps to preempt it from 
growing stronger. Also, President Park’s comments about the THAAD at the NSC 
following the announcement are evidence that public factors influenced the Korean 
government. 
Table 10. Announcement of Seongju as the THAAD deployment site. 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat    
United States    
China    
Policy-Maker   Public 
Participation of the public Low Delay  
 
2. Increasing Demonstrations by the Public 
China and the public factor hampered Korea’s continued push for THAAD, but 
the South Korean government firmly pursued its policy. At the same time, persistent 
protests by the residents caused the South Korean government to consider other candidate 
sites.  
During this time, China continued to press South Korea concerning THAAD. On 
July 16, at the World Peace Forum in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhang Ye Xiu 
said that THAAD, placed on the Korean Peninsula, went beyond the real need for defense 
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on the Korean Peninsula.215 He also stressed that THAAD would undermine China’s 
strategic interests and East Asia’s strategic balance and spark an arms race in East 
Asia.216  
Meanwhile, the United States showed strong support for Korea’s THAAD 
deployment and helped the South Korean government respond. On July 16, the United 
States decided to allow South Korea’s MND access to the THAAD battery, deployed at 
Guam’s Anderson Air Force Base, to help resolve the safety issues in Korea.217 The U.S. 
provision of access to the THAAD base was likely to help dispel the controversy at a 
time when it was claimed that electromagnetic waves from the THAAD radar were 
damaging to residents. South Korea’s MND measured electromagnetic waves from radar 
at the Guam base, at 1.6 kilometers away from the radar measuring 0.0007 watts per 
square meter, much lower than the safety allowance of 10 watts.218  
Nevertheless, this measurement did not alleviate the controversy in Korean 
society. Several experts pointed out that the THAAD radar at Guam was different from 
the one planned for Seongju area due to different environmental conditions, making it 
hard to believe that the measured value would be the same at Seongju. It was not 
objective, they said, because it was an experiment conducted by the MND without 
impartial outside experts.219 In addition, the Korean government and the U.S. military 
were not informative about under what conditions the test was conducted. In practice, 
radar results vary depending on the power setting and power level during the test, and the 
values could vary significantly depending on whether the measurements were made at the 
main beam or outside.  
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As a result, it was possible to imagine that intentional steps were taken to derive 
the lowest possible value. The negative Chinese reaction and U.S. support did not affect 
South Korea’s official response as a result. Due to China’s continued opposition, 
however, South Korea’s National Assembly Speaker Chung Se-Kyun pointed to the 
deployment as an economic factor and said in his speech, “The economic outlook is not 
good because trade friction with China is expected.”220  
During this time, North Korea’s provocations focused the attention of the South 
Korean government but did not affect the THAAD deployment time. North Korea 
successfully launched three ballistic missiles in Hwangju in the early morning of July 18, 
six days after the THAAD deployment was announced.221 Two shots were analyzed as 
SRBMs and one as an MRBM.  
Consequently, South Korean media analyzed North Korea’s intentions as follows: 
1) North Korea showed off its ability to launch simultaneous and surprise attacks, and 2) 
these attacks aggravated the domestic political conflict in South Korea over THAAD 
deployment. 222   The South Korean government strengthened its military readiness 
posture to North Korea’s provocations and argued that if THAAD were deployed, South 
Korea would be able to build a multi-layer interceptor system, along with its existing 
Patriot missiles, that would respond to North Korea’s provocations.223 The government’s 
response fueled the hard-liners’ claim that the THAAD deployment should be expedited, 
but Seoul did not accelerate the official ROK THAAD deployment.  
On July 20, 2016, residents in the area where the THAAD was assigned began to 
protest more strongly but failed to undermine the will of the Korean government. More 
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than 2,000 residents of Seongju held an anti-THAAD rally in Seoul.224 This was the first 
time that residents who had consistently held candlelight gatherings in Seongju after the 
THAAD decision demonstrated in Seoul. Residents of Seongju distinguished themselves 
from outsiders by wearing blue marks, which prevented others with malicious intentions 
from participating in the meetings. The protest was held nonviolently. Demonstrators 
insisted on the government’s withdrawal of the THAAD decision, and did so for the 
following reasons: 1) Before the THAAD decision, there was no government fieldwork, 
and the decision was too hasty. 2) The government did not provide a convincing 
explanation regarding the electromagnetic wave problem.225  On the July 21, President 
Park Geun-Hye insisted that the NSC must thoroughly screen the forces of participation 
in the rally to discern any malicious intentions and emphasized the possibility of left-
wing participation in the rally.226 President Park’s remarks publicly characterized the 
gatherings of Seongju residents as a left-wing rally. Through her statements, it could be 
seen as President Park’s intention to treat the protests as a matter of national security to 
prevent the THAAD issue from becoming a political issue.  
During this time, the U.S. support continued to quell domestic political debate in 
Korea. In an interview with the media, the U.S. Ambassador Mark Lippert refuted the 
claim that the controversial increase in defense contributions was caused by THAAD, 
and that the THAAD deployment meant that South Korea would be incorporated into the 
U.S. MD system.227 He also stressed that the ROK-U.S. alliance decision to deploy 
THAAD had not changed the existing U.S. position to resolve the North Korean issue 
peacefully and that President Obama would continue to maintain a peaceful approach 
toward the North’s denuclearization.228  
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Despite support from the U.S. and North Korea’s provocations in helping to 
deploy THAAD, President Park’s approval rating declined after the THAAD deployment 
decision due to the president’s transparency issues. According to data released by Gallup 
Korea on July 22, 52% of the respondents to a survey question about President Park 
Geun-Hye’s performance in the THAAD deployment region were negative, and 38% 
were positive.229 These results seemed to correlate with continued regional backlash 
after the THAAD decision. A similar evaluation was made nationwide, with 55% 
negatively assessing President Park’s performance and 32% positively.230 The public 
who negatively evaluated Park Geun-Hye’s ability to perform her job had the highest 
priority of ‘transparency’ at 19%, followed by ‘economy policy’ at 14%. 231 
“Transparency” in the THAAD decision-making process and in the process of selecting a 
deployment site was also considered to be a problem in the public’s eyes. 
On July 23, 2016, the day after the survey announcing that President Park Geun-
Hye’s support rate was steadily falling, the Korean government rejected the THAAD site 
proposed by the residents of Seongju. The reason was as follows: 1) accepting a third site 
would cause further controversy, and 2) the THAAD site, which had already been 
announced, had been decided by the ROK-U.S. Joint Working Group after sufficient 
discussion. Whether the Korean government’s response was driven by public opinion is 
difficult to judge considering the state of public opinion at the time. 
On July 24, 2016, China’s and South Korea’s foreign ministers held bilateral talks 
in Laos, where the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was held. In the meeting, which 
South Korea proposed, Wang Yi directly criticized South Korea’s recent THAAD 
decision to harm mutual trust in the presence of South Korean Minister Yoon Byung-Se. 
He also called for a response from the South Korean minister on what action Korea 
                                                 
229 Gallup Korea, Gallup Korea Daily Opinion 220, July 22, 2016, 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=762. 
230 Gallup Korea. 
231 Gallup Korea. 
80 
would take to protect the bilateral relations it had developed.232 His remarks led to the 
expectation that if Yoon’s response did not meet China’s expectations, China would 
retaliate. In addition, China’s strong reaction further aggravated Korea’s concerns. This 
was because, as explained in Chapter II, given its growing economic dependence on 
China, South Korea lacked the leverage to deal with China’s pressure through various 
forms of action. 
On the other hand, China embraced North Korea in contrast to how it had 
behaved toward South Korea. China attended the ARF in the same plane as North Korea 
and used the same accommodation.233 The change in relationship between North Korea 
and China, which had been distant for a long time, meant much to South Korea. This was 
because it also meant that China’s cooperation with the sanctions against North Korea 
that the South Korean government wanted had become far-fetched.  
China’s strong attitude, though, did not cause a change in South Korea’s position. 
This can be seen from the remarks by Minister Yoon. He mentioned in an ARF interview 
that he had a comprehensive exchange of opinions on the North Korean nuclear issue and 
THAAD issues with China, but he argued that a responsible government should, of 
course, deploy THAAD as a defense to protect national security and people’s lives.234 
This represented Seoul’s position of approaching security and economic issues separately. 
In other words, the option to delay or cancel the deployment of THAAD could not be 
considered and there was no change in South Korea’s stance on THAAD.  
In August 2016, China adhered to its traditional opposition to THAAD and began 
to put pressure on South Korea. China indirectly retaliated to THAAD under pressure 
from the public cultural sector. The National Radio and Television Administration 
(NRTA) of China had issued the following guidelines for each broadcaster in China. First, 
the NRTA placed a ban on Korean activities by South Korean pop groups. Second, no 
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performances by South Korean singers were permitted. Further, Korean cultural projects 
were banned, and cultural cooperation with South Korea was restricted.235 Such intense 
pressure from the cultural world on the Chinese side was a significant shock to the 
Korean cultural industry, and the spread of these currents was an issue for the South 
Korean government. According to Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), 
China’s investment in South Korea, which was about $500 million in 2014, increased 
significantly to $ 1.7 billion in the first half of 2016, and more than 70% of the 
investment was focused on the cultural industry and the service industry, not on the 
existing manufacturing industry.236  
During this time, South Korea’s two opposition political parties, the People’s 
Party and the Justice Party, visited Seongju on August 1 and devoted themselves to 
taking advantage of the situation by turning social issues into domestic political issues. 
Residents of the Seongju supported the opposition’s visit, and the opposition parties 
promised the residents that they would raise a problem at the National Assembly, which 
checks the government’s decision. On the same day, the ruling Saenuri Party also visited 
Seongju, but residents’ reaction was very hostile, as expected, in contrast to the 
opposition’s visit.  
One day later, on August 2, President Park once again informed the people and 
the members of the State Council that the decision concerning the deployment of 
THAAD was unlikely to change because it related to a matter of national security and 
people’s safety.237 In line with this argument, she stressed to the members of the State 
Council who attended the State Council that they should make efforts to explain to the 
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public the legitimacy and safety of the deployment and seek their understanding.238 
These remarks represented the official response of Seoul and again formalized that there 
would be no reversal of the THAAD decision or delayed deployment due to domestic 
political conflicts.  
Changes in the pattern of missile launches by North Korea consistently pressured 
the South Korean government but did not alter its decision. On August 3, 2016, North 
Korea fired two Rodong missiles, and one of the two missiles flew 1,000 kilometers to 
fall into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).239 It was the first time a North Korean 
missile had flown as far as Japan’s EEZ and the first time North Korea fired a Rodong 
missile at a maximum range of 1,300 kilometers. Experts have shown that the North 
Korean Rodong missile provocations had all been firing at a high angle to reduce the 
range. This time, however, they were aimed at a lower angle in the direction of U.S. 
Forces Japan (USFJ) bases and military facilities in Japan, from where U.S. 
reinforcements would enter the Korean Peninsula. It was analyzed that the firing was 
maintained at 45–55 degrees.240 South Korea expressed concern through an immediate 
statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but there was no mention of THAAD. 
On August 5, 2016, the Defense Ministry’s proposal to jointly investigate other 
candidate sites in place of Seongju with the THAAD withdrawal fighting committee 
contributed in part to the delay in the deployment of THAAD. This was because the basic 
policy of the government in Seoul had been insisting on the Seongju deployment since 
the decision to deploy THAAD, and the Ministry of Defense’s recommendation of 
investigating other candidates with the Seongju non-governmental organizations was 
difficult because the South Korean government could not say that there was no possibility 
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of deploying THAAD to another candidate area.241 This meant that the deployment of 
THAAD could be delayed because  another deployment area should be examined for 
THAAD and an environmental assessment would be required.  
On the same day, President Park heightened the controversy with comments 
similar to those of the Ministry of Defense’s opinion. At a meeting with lawmakers in 
Daegu and Gyeongbuk, President Park said the government would carefully investigate 
any proposals recommended by lawmakers to consider relocating THAAD to other 
areas.242 President Park also said that the goal of deploying THAAD by the end of 2017 
would remain unchanged unless Seongju recommended another region.243 It was hard to 
say that THAAD’s deployment would not be delayed if such remarks recommended other 
regions. These comments from President Park and the Ministry of Defense’s alternative 
options for the THAAD deployment area contributed to the spread of candlelight vigils 
among citizens. Gimcheon residents near Seongju, who heard rumors that the THAAD 
site could relocate there, also held a candlelight rally with the Seongju residents on 
August 20 to oppose THAAD.244  
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Table 11. Increasing number of demonstrations by the public. 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat    
United States    
China    
Policy-Maker   Public 
Participation of the public Low Delay  
 
3. Additional Nuclear Test by North Korea 
The conflict between China and the United States did not affect Korea’s response 
to THAAD. Additional nuclear tests by North Korea, however, helped accelerate the 
deployment of THAAD. The South Korean government’s comments related to the 
deployment of THAAD following North Korea’s nuclear test demonstrated this claim. 
During this time, China distanced itself from South Korea’s ruling Saenuri Party, 
adding fuel to the nation’s domestic political conflict by exchanging views related to the 
THAAD with the opposition Democratic Party as well. Representatives of the ruling 
Saenuri Party attempted to visit China shortly after the announcement of THAAD for a 
meeting with the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s international liaison department 
in charge of foreign policy, but failed due to Beijing’s refusal.245 On the other hand, 
representatives of the opposition party and the Democratic Party visited China on August 
6 and received a warm welcome from China, and exchanged opinions on THAAD with 
Li Hong Lin, general manager of the China Revolutionary Promotion Association.246 
This Chinese response was the result of the combination of China’s strategic interest in 
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THAAD withdrawal and the opposition parties’ strategic interest in China’s support in 
preparation for the next presidential election, as the opposition parties in South Korea 
were also not in favor of the THAAD deployment.  
Meanwhile, the United States explained the controversial issue of major U.S. 
personnel visiting South Korea to calm the controversy over the deployment of THAAD 
in Korea. Members of the American Diplomatic Association, including Senator Michael 
Siefer, a senior adviser to the Foreign Affairs Committee, visited South Korea to meet 
with lawmakers. Siefer, who was classified as a diplomatic chief of the Democratic 
presidential candidate, met with opposition lawmakers one after another to exchange 
views.247 The main agenda was the THAAD deployment issue, the North Korean nuclear 
issue, and other issues comprehensively. He argued that the United States did not ask 
about the THAAD deployment problem unilaterally, but because of the mutual need of 
the United States and ROK.248  
Also, Navy Lieutenant General James Shiling of the U.S. Defense Department’s 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), who oversees the U.S. missile defense strategy, visited 
South Korea and told reporters about the interceptor’s ability to relate to THAAD. He 
told reporters that the THAAD successfully intercepted the target in all 13 intercept tests, 
which was also reported to the U.S. Congress.249 His remarks strongly contradicted the 
argument that THAAD’s interceptors were limited. He also actively refuted the claims 
and concerns of those who opposed THAAD, saying that THAAD would be operated 
solely as the property of the U.S.-ROK alliance and would not be part of the global 
missile defense system operated by the U.S. military.250 He further addressed China’s 
continued concern that THAAD, if deployed on the Korean Peninsula, could be used to 
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detect Chinese missile bases, by stating that it could be operated only in terminal mode, 
and so cover only territory in the Korean Peninsula.251  
On August 9, 2016, China’s actions at the UN brought the THAAD issue to the 
attention of the world, not only East Asia. China discussed South Korea’s THAAD issue 
at the UN Security Council and opposed the Security Council statement on North Korea’s 
ballistic missile launch.252 China demanded that the UN Security Council add opposition 
to THAAD in the process of adopting a condemnation statement, and the United States 
eventually gave up adopting the statement because it was unacceptable. 253  On the 
international stage, China’s opposition to THAAD was an opportunity to actively 
publicize the fact that the deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula would raise 
tensions in Northeast Asia, and it assumed that such a position would continue in the 
future.  
On September 8, 2016, North Korea conducted a fifth nuclear test with the 
alleged hydrogen bombs. 254 A 5.3 magnitude tremor was detected near the North’s 
nuclear test site, and the United States and China immediately warned of the North’s 
nuclear test. The United States warned that it would have serious consequences. Beijing 
opposed North Korea’s experiment and urged them to avoid further measures that would 
make the situation worse.255 North Korea stated that its fifth nuclear test involved a 
“nuclear warhead that has been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic 
ballistic rockets.”256  
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There were differences between countries about the extent of the test’s explosive 
power. South Korea claimed it was roughly 10 kilotons, while other experts said it would 
be more than 20 kilotons, given the initial symptoms.257  This is more explosive than the 
15-kiloton nuclear warhead that the United States dropped in Hiroshima in 1945. North 
Korea claimed to have conducted its fifth nuclear test with a hydrogen bomb using 
nuclear fusion and that it had the capacity and willingness to produce a variety of small, 
light, and diverse warheads that could be mounted on ballistic rockets.258 North Korea’s 
claim on miniaturized nuclear warheads, however, had not been verified by any source 
except North Korea. 
South Korean President Park suspended her overseas visits due to the North’s 
nuclear test and returned to the Blue House to respond to the North’s further actions 
while warning Kim Jong-Un that his government’s test was an act of self-destruction.259 
She also said she would accept additional provocations as a severe challenge to the ROK-
U.S. alliance.260  
North Korea’s continued nuclear test posed a stumbling block to China, which 
continued to stand against THAAD. On the other hand, South Korea and the United 
States took this opportunity to speed up the deployment of THAAD. The United States 
expressed its willingness to deploy THAAD as soon as possible through formal remarks 
at the House of Representatives and ministerial meetings with the ROK. In addition, 
claims by the USFK Commander and the South Korean government also supported the 
acceleration of the deployment.  
Speaking to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 27, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel R. Russell said the 
deployment would also be accelerated, given the rapid pace of North Korea’s missile 






development.261 In addition, on October 19, Secretary of State John Kerry said that he 
would make efforts to deploy THAAD to South Korea as soon as possible to comply with 
its security commitment to its ally, South Korea, at the “2 + 2” ministerial meeting in 
Washington, D.C.262 The South Korean government supported the acceleration of the 
U.S. deployment of THAAD through remarks by the defense and foreign ministers.263 
Although Seoul did not disclose the deployment schedule due to military issues, it 
claimed that the remarks at the ministerial talks represented Seoul’s official position to 
accelerate the deployment of THAAD. 
Table 12. Additional nuclear test by North Korea. 
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat High Accelerate  
United States   North Korea 
China   North Korea 
Policy-Maker   North Korea 
Participation of the public    
 
4. Korea’s Political Crisis and the New U.S. President  
The election of the Republican president of the United States and the political 
crisis in South Korea did not affect THAAD deployment at the beginning. But continued 
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pressure from the United States helped accelerate South Korea’s decision on the 
deployment. 
In November and December 2016, it was very likely that THAAD could be 
affected by the issue of leader replacement in both South Korea and the United States. In 
November, the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, became president 
through the U.S. presidential election, which was likely to influence THAAD deployment. 
While he was a candidate he argued for the possibility of withdrawing U.S. troops from 
Korea, and discussed the issue of defense-sharing for U.S. allies.264  
In December 2016, South Korea’s domestic political situation was very confusing 
due to President Park’s impeachment, but South Korea’s position on THAAD had not 
changed. This was supported in remarks by Prime Minister Hwang Gyo-An’s, who 
legally took the place of the president. President Park’s impeachment vote at the National 
Assembly on December 9 deprived President Park of her legal role and authority as the 
president.265 The relationship between Park Geun-Hye and Choi Soon-Sil, raised in the 
Korean media, turned out to be true; Choi Soon-Sil intervened in the Park Geun-Hye 
administration illegally and abused her power and forced the chaebol to bribe her private 
firm. 266  The scandal eventually led to prosecution investigations and impeachment, 
which passed the National Assembly on  December 9. The motion passed with 234 votes, 
more than two-thirds, although the ruling Saenuri Party took the 128 seats among the 300 
members.267 The ruling party had enough seats to oppose impeachment, but there was a 
conflict of opinion within the party and many voted in favor of the growing number of 
people attending the candlelight vigils.  
Park Geun-Hye’s impeachment meant that policy on THAAD could change. 
Because of her impeachment, Park could no longer exercise the power of the president, 
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and the prime minister would act with the president’s legal authority. Many members of 
the media focused on the fact that the policy could be changed by the prime minister’s 
political tendency or preference.268  
During this time, the prime minister, Hwang Gyo-An, became acting president, 
and through media interviews he once again communicated the official opinion of the 
ROK government regarding THAAD deployment. He said in an interview that he 
expected a clash with opposition parties regarding the deployment of THAAD, but South 
Korea’s THAAD policy stance remained unchanged and had no intention of overturning 
it. 269 The commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command also supported 
South Korea’s position regarding THAAD. He said he was concerned about the political 
situation in South Korea but insisted that THAAD should be deployed normally.270  
On December 12, 2016, in a defense committee meeting held at the National 
Assembly, Han Min-Gu strongly rejected the opposition legislator’s opinion to review 
THAAD, citing China’s backlash.271 The committee also said that it would be difficult to 
finalize the deployment by the first half of 2017, but some claimed that the government 
would deploy THAAD in a hurry. If China’s economic sanctions continued, with Park 
Geun-Hye’s impeachment likely to push ahead the presidential election, South Korea’s 
politics and the economy would be difficult to get out of the unstable situation. 
Nevertheless, Seoul’s position on THAAD remained unchanged.  
At the same time, China also pressured the ROK by mentioning the THAAD issue, 
noting the political turmoil in South Korea and the possible changes in policy regarding 
U.S. forces in South Korea due to the U.S. presidential election. For example, an 
unexpected visit by a Chinese Foreign Ministry official was evaluated as a political 
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strategy to spread opposition to THAAD in South Korea. 272  According to Korea 
Broadcasting System (KBS) News in South Korea, on December 30, Hai Chen, the 
Chinese government official responsible for the THAAD deployment issue, met with 
political and economic figures in South Korea despite opposition from the ROK 
government.273 He warned that the deployment of THAAD would make it difficult for 
South Korean companies to do business in China, and he made a diplomatic discourtesy 
by describing South Korea as a small country, saying, “The small country does not listen 
to the great nation.”274 China’s diplomatic junta was a political strategy to reinforce the 
opposition to THAAD in politically unstable South Korea, because there was no formal 
discussion with officials of the ROK government; however, he had contact with 
opposition lawmakers, progressive think tanks, media representatives, and representatives 
of South Korean companies on the THAAD issue. Party approval ratings announced by 
Gallup Korea also make this assessment possible. Due to Park’s impeachment, in 
December the approval rating of 35% for the Democratic Party (one of the opposition 
parties) was the highest since October 2016, and significantly above the 13% rating for 
the Saenuri Party.275   
In January 2017, South Korea’s defense minister reported to the acting president 
the ministry’s main objectives for 2017, arguing that South Korea’s position on the 
THAAD deployment should continue to be pursued.276 Also, the Ministry of Defense 
recommended that the South Korean government continue its THAAD deployment based 
on the following security situation analysis: 1) increased uncertainty in defense policy 
due to the launch of a new U.S. administration; 2) increased instability due to China’s 
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coercive foreign policy; 3) the possibility of further provocation due to the advancement 
of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities.277 The acting president continued to 
support the deployment of THAAD in South Korea and the official position of the ROK 
government remained unchanged.278  
By contrast, public opinion gradually moved to opposition to THAAD, as 
Seongju citizens wanted. The main reasons were the military gains and national interests 
related to THAAD, which were raised continuously throughout the THAAD 
controversy. 279  According to a Gallup Korea survey conducted in January, 51% of 
Koreans agreed with THAAD, and 40% disapproved. These figures were 5% lower in 
favor of THAAD than before Park Geun-Hye was impeached, and 9% higher in 
opposition to the deployment.280 Changes in these figures showed that the number of 
people who favored THAAD had continued to grow in 2016, and reached 56% in August, 
but now moved towards opposing THAAD. The majority of those who were still in favor, 
80%, were concerned about North Korea’s threats; those on the other side were 
concerned about the effects of THAAD, 20%, and more about national interests, 17%, 
than military security.281   
Entering March 2017, North Korea’s provocations had been a catalyst for 
stimulating hard-liners in the new U.S. administration, supporting early deployment of 
THAAD. North Korea launched missile provocations on March 5 and March 21, and 
starting February 17 criticized the ROK-U.S. alliance military training in February and 
March, as it had done every year. North Korea simultaneously launched a range of 
missiles at various distances, a change in the launch pattern aimed at the THAAD base, 
which was scheduled to be deployed in South Korea. Experts said that the simultaneous 
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launch of the MRBMs was aimed at the ranges of Seongju, where THAAD would be 
deployed, and the U.S. Marine Corps Airbase in Japan, Iwakuni.282 In addition, North 
Korea’s continued missile provocations were propelled by Hwasung-12 (IRBM) launches 
on April 5 and 16, considering the U.S. Trump administration’s plans to visit Asia.283  
On April 4, 2017, the South Korean government decided to provide KRW 1.3 
trillion in government-level funding to Seongju in order to compensate for the THAAD 
deployment, allocated in various ways: 1) construction of highways and trains, 2) 
subsidies to local specialty cultivation farms, and 3) Seongju landscape maintenance and 
cable grounding. 284  This government support was used as a means to mitigate the 
antipathy caused by THAAD. According to the local newspaper Gyeongbuk Ilbo, 83.6% 
answered in a questionnaire that Seongju citizens should be supported by the government 
if THAAD was deployed.285 This reflected the desire of the citizens of Seongju-gun to 
gain economic benefits, considering that the deployment of THAAD was in fact in 
progress. 
On April 16, 2017, the U.S. Vice President, Mike Pence, visited South Korea. 
This first visit to Asia after the Trump administration came to power had significant 
implications for China and North Korea, because the main objectives of the visit were the 
cost issues associated with the ROK-U.S. alliance, North Korea’s ongoing nuclear threat, 
and THAAD. 286  His visit put diplomatic pressure on South Korea, and its acting 
president did not want the THAAD deployment to be reversed or delayed by the 
upcoming South Korean presidential election.  
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Eventually, after meetings between the acting president and Pence in South Korea, 
the ROK government decided to rush a little further.287 Such U.S. moves and South 
Korea’s decision also meant a changed U.S. policy toward East Asia. The visit to South 
Korea by U.S. Vice President Pence, known as a hard-liner, was politically influential 
enough to pressure Seoul to deploy THAAD, which the South Korean acting president 
accepted, and Seoul’s official response was to deploy THAAD at an early date. 
Politically, Hwang’s decision was understandable, even considering the ever-increasing 
number of opposition party support rates since the beginning of the year. The opposition 
party support rate increased steadily from January 2017 to reach 44% in March, while the 
popularity of the renamed ruling Liberal Korea Party was steadily falling to 12%.288 It 
appeared it would be challenging to maintain the regime considering the support rates of 
the next presidential candidate by the people.289 
On April 26, 2017, some equipment of THAAD, which came to the ROK at dawn 
Korean time, entered the THAAD site of Seongju.290 The U.S. military brought two 
THAAD launchers and fire control radar to Seongju Golf Course within four hours after 
midnight on the day. The USFK undertook a site relocation procedure under the Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) to deploy THAAD for over a month after the two THAAD 
launchers and some equipment were brought through Osan Base in March. 291 
Considering the opposition from Seongju citizens, USFK deployed THAAD equipment 
by surprise at dawn instead of during the day.  
South Korea’s MND consistently stated that it was physically impossible for 
equipment to be deployed before the presidential election considering the ROK-U.S. 
consultations process on the deployment of THAAD. However, effectively ridiculing the 
                                                 
287 Withnall. 
288 “Gallop Korea Daily Opinion,” Korea Gallop 248 (March 3, 2017), 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=817. 
289 “Gallop Korea Daily Opinion.” 




MND’s excuse, the THAAD system had been brought in and deployed before the 
presidential election. Many experts charged that the deployment was quick to make the 
deployment of THAAD irreversible after the presidential election, in situations where a 
progressive president was likely to be elected.292  The action of the ROK-U.S. alliance 
once again stimulated Seongju citizens; 200 villagers prevented THAAD equipment from 
entering the deployment area, but they were suppressed by more than 8,000 police 
officers. The number of opposing residents decreased compared to the 5,000 people who 
held the rally when they first opposed THAAD.293  
Table 13. Korea’s political crisis and the new U.S. President.  
Assessment 
I.V. 
Influence on D.V. Accelerate/Delay Dependent 
North Korea’s threat    
United States High Accelerate  
China    
Policy-Maker High Accelerate United States 
Participation of the public    
 
As expected, the progressive Moon Jae-In regime took the opportunity presented 
by the impeachment of the third conservative regime in South Korea to win the 
presidential election on May 10. The new regime did not make any progress in the 
deployment of THAAD due to questions about the decision-making process regarding 
THAAD during the preceding conservative regime. The result was a temporary 
suspension of further deployment under the new president’s direction. 
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Despite the president’s instructions, however, many people still supported 
THAAD. According to a poll immediately after the Moon Jae-In election, 53% of the 
South Korean public were in favor of THAAD, an increase of 2% compared to the 
beginning of the year, and 32% opposed it, an 8% decrease from the beginning of the 
year.294 Most of the people in favor were concerned about national security and the 
safety of the people, while those who were opposed continued to mention the drawbacks 
of THAAD.295  
B. CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND PHASE 
The conclusion of this chapter is summarized in Table 14. This chapter analyzed 
what factors affected the timing of the THAAD deployment in South Korea and looked at 
which factors affected timing the most. Official discussion by the ROK-U.S. alliance and 
the import of some parts of the THAAD system took place quickly due to the political 
crisis in South Korea. Nevertheless, it took a long time for all the planned powers to be 
deployed due to the intervention of the Moon Jae-In regime. 
Table 14. Analysis of the second phase. 
 External Factors Domestic Factors 
2nd Phase North Korea U.S. China Leader Public 
Announcement     Delay 
Demonstration     Delay 
Nuclear Test Accelerate     
Political Crisis  Accelerate  Accelerate  
THAAD deployment 
Key: In the table, red: high, yellow: low,             : Dependence 
 
This chapter shows how, in contrast to the first phase, the primary independent 
variables were in conflict, with external factors acting to accelerate and domestic factors 
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acting to delay the timing of the deployment. The factor that contributed most to the 
delayed deployment of THAAD is public opinion, and the factors that accelerated 
deployment time are North Korea’s nuclear threat and changes in pressure from the 
United States and China, which pushed the ROK leadership to a decision.  
In chronological order, immediately after the THAAD deployment was 
determined, the factor of public opinion, a domestic factor, influenced the delay of 
THAAD deployment by forming persistent opposition and anti-THAAD public opinion 
through media. Yet, due to security threats from North Korea’s nuclear test and political 
pressure from the new administration of the United States, the timing of the deployment 
of THAAD eventually accelerated. Therefore, the most decisive factors among the 
independent variables were the external factors.  
Looking more closely, first, it is clear that North Korea’s nuclear test made a 
decisive contribution to advancing the THAAD deployment. This is because, as 
explained earlier, the South Korean government and the president responded very 
sensitively to North Korea’s nuclear test, and deepened the ROK government’s worries 
as many experts assessed the progress made on North Korea’s nuclear capability.  
North Korea’s advanced nuclear threat also stimulated the U.S. intention to 
achieve North Korea’s denuclearization, putting political pressure on South Korea. As 
can be seen in Russell’s and Kerry’s official remarks, North Korea’s nuclear tests also 
influenced the will of the United States with substantial THAAD assets. North Korea’s 
dangerous actions helped the ROK-U.S. alliance to accelerate the THAAD deployment.  
Furthermore, continued pressure from the United States played a significant role in 
the rapid deployment of THAAD. Since the advent of the new administration, the United 
States continually pressured South Korea to deploy THAAD. As part of this effort, since 
the launch of a new administration in the United States, Vice President Pence visited South 
Korea before any other country and achieved THAAD deployment sooner after discussions 
with Seoul. Also, the ROK acting president’s concern about the upcoming South Korean 
presidential election promoted this result because the president’s impeachment from the 
same political party had already given much support to Moon Jae-in.  
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Lastly, public opinion in Seongju areas opposed to THAAD contributed to 
delaying the start of THAAD deployment shortly after THAAD deployment was 
determined, but not significantly. As mentioned earlier, the announcement of the MND’s 
THAAD site was influenced by the opposition of residents living near that site. Even the 
MND’s announcement of THAAD deployment was delayed because residents did not 
attend, supporting this claim. In addition, even after the location was decided, the 
government raised additional candidates and the THAAD placement did not get on track. 
A high-level view of the conclusion of this chapter is shown in Figure 6. After 
THAAD was decided on, the deployment of the THAAD system was still controversial 
both domestically and internationally, because South Korea continued to face controversy 
over the selection of the deployment area. Furthermore, there was international debate 
over whether the actual deployment would be carried out. The THAAD deployment 
timeline was initially delayed due to the influence of public protests. Nevertheless, 
further nuclear tests by North Korea and political pressures associated with the 
emergence of the Trump administration in the United States contributed to the rapid start 
of the deployment.  
 
Figure 6. Timeline of the THAAD issue during the second phase. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Debates over the pros and cons associated with THAAD’s deployment took place 
in several spheres, among Korean experts, politicians, and the South Korean public.296 
The South Korean government had to cope with the increasing threat of North Korean 
nuclear capabilities and sustain cooperation with the United States for the survival of the 
nation. At the same time, the ROK government had to consider its relationship with 
China, on which it is becoming more economically dependent. Domestic political 
problems exacerbated this complicated situation. 297  The scandal associated with the 
president’s corruption increased public doubts about the THAAD decision-making 
process. The three-year-long THAAD issue was still prominent in the media and among 
the public during President Park’s trial.  
This thesis has divided the controversy over THAAD according to the phases of 
decision and deployment, and assessed the influence of five independent drivers in this 
timeline: 1) changes in pressure from the United States; 2) the change in pressure from 
China, driving external structural changes in South Korea; 3) the increased nuclear threat 
from North Korea; 4) the influence of the ROK’s powerful presidency and conservative 
South Korean policy-makers; and 5) the political participation of the public. The thesis 
has evaluated how these drivers influenced South Korea’s decision making from the start 
of the debate to the deployment of the THAAD system.  
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE THAAD ISSUE 
The first conclusion of this thesis is that the North Korean threat played the most 
critical role in the decision itself and in accelerating deployment of THAAD throughout 
the timeline. In response to the North Korean nuclear threat, which has increased rapidly 
since 2014, South Korea responded very sensitively and agilely using military and 
political means. Thus, the first official mention of THAAD was after North Korea’s 
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January 2016 nuclear test. North Korea’s September 2016 nuclear test pushed South 
Korea to deploy THAAD more quickly, despite its economic dependence on China and 
China’s opposition to THAAD. North Korea’s increased nuclear threats and their 
technological developments have raised concerns about the survival of the South Korean 
people, which has increased THAAD support. Although opposition by residents in the 
THAAD deployment area continued, the fact that the public opinion of South Korea as a 
whole was consistently supportive relieved the government’s concerns over China’s 
reaction to the decision to deploy THAAD. 
The second conclusion of this thesis is that political pressures from the United 
States and China influenced the ROK’s THAAD decision in different directions. To 
reach this conclusion, this thesis examined senior Chinese and American visits to Seoul 
and the remarks of those officials. More specifically, the continued political pressure of 
the United States influenced South Korea’s support of the THAAD decision, but China’s 
continued opposition and economic pressure at certain times restrained South Korea’s 
THAAD deployment. Nevertheless, China’s pressure did not cause the South Korean 
government to reverse its THAAD decision.  
The remarks and official visits of high-ranking officials from both countries put 
political pressure on South Korea, due to its asymmetric alliance and asymmetrical 
economic relations, which in turn pressured the autonomy of South Korea. But it was not 
true that asymmetric economic relations between South Korea and China compromised 
the ROK’s autonomy, as Park asserts. This thesis brings new consideration to his work on 
the THAAD episode. Park argues that as South Korea increases its economic dependence 
on China, its autonomy is affected. 298  Yet, this thesis shows that his argument is 
applicable to bilateral relations but has difficulties in terms of multilateral relations. It is a 
fact that South Korea’s trade dependence on China has continued to increase since 2002 
and is the highest among trading partners. As can be seen in Figure 7, the ROK’s 
dependence on exports to China was 10.7% in 2000 and 26.8% in 2018. Also, South 
Korea’s import dependence on China reached a record high of 21.4% in 2016, compared 
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with 8% in 2000. It has been on a slight decline since 2016, but it still has a high number. 
Notable is that overall South Korea’s dependence on China for exports and imports has 
been on a steady rise since 2012 when the ROK’s trade dependence in general was 
lowered.299 This fact suggests that China’s political and economic pressures, as Park 
insisted, should compromise South Korea’s autonomy to have a significant influence on 
THAAD’s decision. But this thesis shows that China could not compromise South 
Korea’s autonomy significantly because the impact did not go beyond the agreements of 
the U.S. alliance.  
 
Figure 7. South Korea’s economic dependence on China.300 
The third conclusion of this thesis is that ROK policy-makers, a domestic factor, 
influenced the THAAD deployment decision, but did not affect the deployment of 
THAAD equipment. The emergence of a progressive leader with different political 
tendencies, however, did contribute to the delay in the full deployment of THAAD. As 
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mentioned in Chapter II, the Korean president is at the pinnacle of the decision-making 
process and has great power. Therefore, the interest of the president plays a decisive role 
in the decision of the state. President Park Geun-Hye, who was reluctant to make a 
THAAD decision because of her political relationship with China at the beginning of the 
THAAD case, was very disappointed by China’s reaction after North Korea’s January 
2016 nuclear test. This shift in her perception contributed greatly to the determination of 
the THAAD issue. But then, her political crisis reduced her contribution, and as she 
eventually stepped down as president, her contribution disappeared. The progressive 
president who inherited her legacy tried to reverse her decision as expected, but the 
pressure from the United States and the increasing threat from North Korea defeated his 
efforts.  
The fourth conclusion is that one of the domestic factors, the participation of the 
public, did not affect the THAAD deployment decision, but for a time delayed 
deployment after the THAAD decision. The reason for the lack of influence of public 
opinion on the THAAD decision was that by the time the public became interested in 
THAAD, the candidate regions for deployment were already announced. The citizens of 
the candidate regions showed the typical NIMBY phenomenon in different ways. 
Citizens of other candidate regions were less worried after the announcement of Seongju 
as the location of THAAD’s deployment, but Seongju citizens began to protest more 
intensely. The opposition movement took place in various forms, including one-person 
demonstrations, candlelight demonstrations, and public meetings. The movement spread 
throughout the country via the Internet and Social Network Service (SNS), but failed to 
form a counterargument on the THAAD in general and failed to stop it. When the 
Seongju region received incentives from the state in the form of subsidies and local 
development plans, the protests gradually faded. 
Finally, the conclusion of this thesis is that in the first phase the external factors 
were hardly influenced by domestic factors, whereas domestic factors were influenced by 
external factors. Considering the nature of the THAAD problem, which had been much 
more controversial inside of South Korea, it could be argued that this was natural. In the 
second phase, other variables tried to influence the leadership. Interestingly, external 
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factors forced the rapid deployment of THAAD, while domestic public opinion 
contributed to delayed deployment. 
Table 15. Cumulative factors for THAAD decision making. 
 External Factors Domestic Factors 
I.V. 
Events 
N. Korea U.S. China Leader Public 
Rodong Test Accelerate     
Strategic Ambiguity   Delay   
Nuclear Test Accelerate      
Leader’s perception    Accelerate  
Unha-3 Launch Accelerate      
Alliance Decision Accelerate   Accelerate  
THAAD Decision 
Announcement     Delay 
Demonstration     Delay 
Nuclear Test Accelerate     
Political Crisis  Accelerate  Accelerate  
THAAD deployment 
Key: In the table, red: high, yellow: low,            : dependence.  
 
B. DETERRENCE IMPLICATIONS 
The THAAD issue is an example of how realist claims are more explanatory in 
military decisions. Realist arguments highlight the perceived decline in the credibility of 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella and the shortage of South Korea’s missile defense capabilities 
against North Korean threats.  
To deter North Korean conventional aggression during the Cold War, the United 
States vowed to repel attacks on South Korea by deploying tactical nuclear weapons on 
the Korean Peninsula from 1958 to December 1991. In order to balance the growing 
threat from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles, the United States promised to 
continue its nuclear umbrella over the Korean Peninsula even after the removal of tactical 
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nuclear weapons. 301  In the 46th to 48th SCM held from 2014 to 2016, the U.S. 
government reaffirmed extended deterrence to South Korea through the Joint 
Communiques. In these meetings, the U.S. Secretary of Defense reassured the South 
Korean government by promising a full range of military capabilities, including nuclear 
weapons, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities from the United States.302 
As part of the commitment, after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on January 8, 2016, 
the United States deployed a B-52 bomber and F-22 stealth fighters over the Korean 
Peninsula. Additionally, on March 13, the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier John C. Stennis 
arrived at Busan Port.303 
In fact, the U.S. nuclear umbrella reassures South Korean leaders of survival and 
serves as a psychological factor that is actually responding to North Korean threats.304 It 
also serves as an element that prevents a domestic debate in South Korea over the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons to counter North Korea. Nevertheless, North Korea’s 
continued nuclear tests have caused South Korea to question the credibility of the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella over the Korean Peninsula. Some experts argue that the success factor 
of the U.S. extended deterrence is credibility, and that this is the most challenging 
problem to solve as North Korea’s missile ranges increase.305 
In other words, the United States should solve these questions: 1) Will the United 
States use nuclear weapons to defend its ally at a time when South Korea has been 
attacked or a war is imminent? 2) Will it be possible to attack a country that is believed to 
have nuclear weapons, not only with U.S. nuclear weapons but also with overwhelming 
                                                 
301 Roehrig, “The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea: Nuclear Weapons and Extended 
Deterrence,” 651. 
302 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. Joint Communique of 48th U.S.-ROK Security 
Consultative Meeting. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2016; Joint Communique of 47th U.S.-ROK 
Security Consultative Meeting. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2015; Joint Communique of 46th U.S.-
ROK Security Consultative Meeting. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2014. 
303 Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2016 Defense White Paper, 247. 
304 Roehrig, 674–675. 
305 Roehrig, 656; William W. Kaufmann, The Requirement of Deterrence (Princeton, NJ: Center for 
International Studies, 1954), 19. 
105 
military power? Because of these questions, many politicians in South Korea argue that 
the U.S. nuclear umbrella is weak and that the United States should consider deploying 
tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea again. In particular, the Supreme Council and 
floor leader of South Korea’s ruling Saenuri Party, after the North’s fourth nuclear test in 
January 2016, insisted that South Korea develop its own nuclear weapons on a self-
defense basis to counter the North’s nuclear threats. 306 According to results from a 
survey of South Koreans in January 2016, 54% of South Korean adults supported 
demands for the ROK’s nuclear armament, showing that public opinion also supports that 
argument.307 The U.S. presidential election in 2016 also fueled South Korea’s desire to 
acquire nuclear weapons. The U.S. Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, 
argued that South Korea was not carrying its share of defense contributions, and 
considered the possibility of withdrawing USFK, causing South Korean leaders to worry 
again about the credibility of the nuclear umbrella promised by the United States.308  
In fact, Terence Roehrig insists that the United States would not allow the use of 
nuclear weapons to defend South Korea and would likely focus on conventional 
attacks.309 The reason is that the use of nuclear weapons is likely to weaken the norm of 
nuclear use on other battlefields in the future, and nuclear use would have devastating 
consequences.310 Roehrig also points to the overwhelming ability of U.S. conventional 
weapons to achieve its strategic effect.311  
It is necessary to appreciate South Korea’s lack of capabilities to understand the 
deployment of THAAD as a reaction to concerns over the credibility of the U.S nuclear 
umbrella. This is because, according to the realists’ argument, the imbalance of power in 
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anarchy’s international politics is a motivation for a state to seek an internal balance 
through an increase of the state’s national material power.312 From 2014 to 2016, South 
Korea sought to increase its own ability to defend the Korean Peninsula against North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles, which is an example of internal balancing.  
The ROK established its attack system, called the Kill Chain, to effectively 
suppress and respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats. Yet, according to the 
2016 Defense White Paper, there are limitations to the ROK’s surveillance and strike 
capability. Specifically, the ROK military has not secured high-altitude reconnaissance 
unmanned aerial vehicles (HUAV) and military reconnaissance satellites for surveillance 
of North Korea, and does not have enough ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-
ground guided missiles to strike major North Korean facilities.313  
South Korea is also developing its own Korea Air & Missile Defense (KAMD) 
system, which consists of an early warning system, command control system, and 
intercept system. In 2016, South Korea possessed early warning radar, Aegis ship 
capabilities, Patriot missiles to carry out missions for core facilities, and planes in the 
metropolitan area. In addition, the ROK Ministry of National Defense expected purchase 
of an upgraded version of Patriot missiles for overlapping defense of critical assets, and 
completion of development and deployment of the Medium Range Surface to Air Missile 
(M-SAM) and the Long Range Surface to Air Missile (L-SAM) to be around mid-
2020.314 Thus additional assets and capabilities are needed that were not yet obtained in 
2016.  
According to the analysis and projections of John Schilling and Henry Kan in 
April 2015, North Korea’s delivery system had about 1,000 missiles in 2015; estimates of 
its arsenal varied from “Low-End” to “High-End” by 2020. (See Figure 8.) Considering 
that the military response should always be prepared for the worst case and prepare for 
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the threat, it is hard to say that South Korea’s countermeasures are realistically 
responding to the “high-end.” Because even if the deployment of M-SAM and L-SAM 
begins around mid-2020, it will take considerable time to deploy across South Korea, 
which would put some limitations on filling security gaps. Also, if some time is required 
for correcting errors, or operational requirements in the development stage occur, the 
development period could grow.  
 
Figure 8. Delivery system projection of North Korea.315 
Still, questions remain as to whether the ROK-U.S. alliance’s decision to deploy 
THAAD to counter North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats is solely due to gaps in 
defense forces. The first question is whether, as John J. Mearsheimer argues, the state 
continues to pursue material power until it has the capacity to pursue a consistently 
overwhelming capability in the context of anarchy of international politics. 316  The 
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second question is whether THAAD deployments actually play a role in external balance 
and preventing abandonment by the United States, even though other options, such as the 
deployment of aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and nuclear submarines, can play a 
similar role.  
Thus, South Korea’s THAAD resolution served as an axis to maintain external 
balance as one of the military options to fill security gaps against North Korea’s growing 
nuclear and missile threats, as well as a requirement to fill the gaps in internal balancing. 
C. POLICY RELEVANCE: THE PERIL OF SOUTH KOREA’S ‘BALANCER 
POLICY’ 
The conclusion of this thesis conveys the following important consideration to 
decision-makers in South Korea: South Korea’s ‘balancer policy’ hinders rapid military 
response to North Korean threats. South Korea continues its efforts to gain both Chinese 
economic interests and U.S. security interests. Balanced diplomacy in Korea, however, 
poses a dilemma in the ROK’s policy exhibited by the THAAD controversy and by the 
many concerns about the decision and deployment of THAAD. This policy soon hindered 
the rapid response to North Korean threats. Repeated phenomena would pose a serious 
threat to South Korea’s survival. 
South Korea’s desire for balanced diplomacy began with the growth of economic 
and military power. The ROK continued to demand the return of OPCON, which has 
been delegated to the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command since the 1980s. 317 
Eventually, in 1994, the armistice OPCON was returned, and in 2003, the Roh Moo-
Hyun government demanded the return of the wartime OPCON.318 Although the return 
of wartime OPCON was delayed to 2020 due to North Korea’s provocations and 
domestic political debate, the current trend toward increasing autonomy continued within 
the framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance. It also brought about considerable changes in 
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foreign policy.319 South Korea’s efforts to strengthen independence led the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration to attempt to transition from U.S.-centered diplomacy to “balanced 
diplomacy” in Northeast Asia.320 Such a transition has not only gradually diversified 
South Korea’s diplomacy previously centered on the United States, but also sought to 
make balance a reality, especially by improving relations with China, one of the major 
powers.321 President Lee Myung-Bak continued to carry out this policy and signed a 
strategic cooperative partnership with China on August 25, 2008. President Park Geun-
Hye also tried to improve ROK-China relations with President Xi Jinping, and in 
September 2015, South Koreans visited China to celebrate the 70th anniversary of 
Victory Day as part of these efforts.322    
As a matter of fact, South Korea’s efforts to promote national interests by acting 
as a balancer between China and the United States in Northeast Asia have the potential to 
benefit relations with both the United States and China if successful. Conversely, failure 
could result in pressure from both the United States and China, or the lack of a clear 
relationship with either side. South Korea, for example, has curbed North Korea’s nuclear 
threat through extended deterrence from the United States, but there is a risk that the U.S. 
commitments may become uncertain if relations with the United States are compromised 
by balanced diplomacy. Moreover, if Sino-Korean relations are properly improved 
through a balancer policy, economic and security interests can be expected, but if not, 
there is a high possibility of being vulnerable to China’s economic and security 
interference.  
South Korea has pursued a security advantage in this dilemma, but it has been 
delayed considerably in time. North Korea and South Korea share borders, and North 
Korea could launch large quantities of missiles whenever and wherever they want. North 
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Korea even has the ability to bomb Japanese bases where U.S. assets are waiting to enter 
the peninsula. Nevertheless, South Korea, in response to North Korean threats, succeeded 
in fully deploying an entire THAAD artillery in September 2017, after three years of 
deliberation. But the THAAD experience shows that South Korea’s continued pursuit of 
a balancer policy, which requires good relations with China, could hinder the rapid 
military response to North Korean threats.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
This thesis has the following limitations: 1) the reliability of data related to 
President Park Geun-hye, and 2) the selection of factors that influenced South Korea’s 
THAAD decision.  
First of all, most of the data on President Park Geun-hye, one of the independent 
variables, were inaccessible, because the trial regarding Park’s scandal was in progress. 
For these reasons, most of Park Geun-hye’s data were analyzed through newspapers or 
publicly available information. Analysis of data from secondary sources may reduce the 
credibility or objectivity of the data. 
Second, limiting external factors that could affect South Korea’s policy decisions 
related to North Korea, China, and the United States have resulted in the exclusion of the 
effects of factors such as Japan and Russia or the role of various institutions. Japan and 
Russia have a significant portion of the security sector in East Asia. Restricting external 
factors to the United States, China, and North Korea increases the likelihood of 
delivering a narrow perspective to research conclusions.  
E. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The result of the thesis emphasizes the need for further research on South Korea’s 
autonomy: How should South Korea, the middle power nation, change its relations with 
China and the United States to maximize the ROK’s autonomy? Alliances and economic 
interdependencies are pervasive phenomena throughout the world. Indeed, similar to 
South Korea, many countries in East Asia rely on the United States for security, and their 
111 
economies depend on China. In these countries, the degree of dependence varies widely 
and their degree of autonomy varies greatly. 
For example, as shown in Figure 9, countries in East Asia might have different 
relationships with the United States and China. At the same time, their degree of 
autonomy also differs. The “C State” shows how a country might have great dependence 
on both powers, as indicated by the nearly balanced positions of the respective Military 
and Economy markers, but the “C State” could still have maximum autonomy because 
the dependence is balanced (as indicated by the red Autonomy marker positioned at the 
intersection of the x and y axes). Comparing selected countries with information from 
historical cases would allow an assessment of when autonomy is maximized for South 
Korea. This type of research would also be meaningful for other countries. 
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